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ABSTRACT

This Article reviews U.S. compliance with the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and the ability of foreign
governments to seek redress for treaty violations in federal
courts. The Vienna Convention requires signatory states to
notify detained foreign nationals of their right to consular
access. While the United States has sought to ensure that
foreign governments comply with the provisions of the Vienna
Convention when they detain U.S. citizens abroad, it has
failed to ensure that foreign nationals are provided with
comparableprotection when they are detained in the United
States.
The Author examines several cases in which both foreign
nationals and foreign governments have sought redress for
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violations of the Vienna Convention in federal courts.
Specifically, the Author focuses on the ability of foreign
governments to enforce treaty obligations in U.S. courts. The
Author considers when the United States is required to
comply with treaty obligations, whether a foreign government
can seek redressfor treaty violations in federal courts, and
what remedies are availablefor such violations. Finally, the
Author makes several recommendations to improve U.S.
compliance with the Vienna Convention as well as with other
consularagreements.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States has long recognized the importance of
diplomatic and consular relations. Indeed, as a victim of one of
the most egregious violations of diplomatic and consular rights in
recent memory, the United States has vigorously enforced these
obligations on behalf of itself and U.S. citizens abroad. 1 Despite
extensive efforts to enforce these rights abroad, the United States
has failed to implement the obligations set forth in the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention) at home.
The Vienna Convention was adopted in 1963 to codify the
rights and obligations of member states with respect to consular
relations. 2 To facilitate the exercise of consular functions, the
Vienna Convention provides that consular officials shall be free to
communicate with, and have access to, their nationals at all
times.3 Similarly, foreign nationals shall have the same freedom
to communicate and meet with consular officers. 4 A particularly
sensitive issue arises when a foreign national is detained by law
enforcement officials. Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention
provides that the competent authorities shall, without delay,
inform a detained national of his right to communicate with
consular officials. 5 In addition, Article 36(1)(c) grants consular

officials the right to visit, converse, and correspond with 6a
detained national and to arrange for his legal representation.
It
Essentially, the Vienna Convention serves two functions.
serves the needs of foreign nationals by allowing them to
communicate with consular officials when they are detained.
Given the likelihood of culture and language differences, consular
officials can provide critical information about the legal process
and the rights of detained nationals. The Vienna Convention also
serves the needs of signatory states by allowing them to monitor
the fair treatment of their nationals abroad.

On November 4, 1979, Iranian students occupied the U.S. Embassy in
1.
Tehran. GARY SICK, ALL FALL DOWN 195-96 (1985). United States diplomatic and
consular officials were held hostage by Iran for 444 days before they were released
on January 20, 1981. Id. at 341. See generally AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN (Paul
Kreisberg ed., 1985).
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
2.

596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Id. art. 36, para. 1(a).
3.
4.

Id.

5.
6.

Id. art. 36, para. 1(b).
Id. art. 36, para. 1(c).
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Despite the importance of the Vienna Convention and the
right of consular access, the United States has failed to ensure
that these obligations are fully implemented domestically.
Specifically, the United States has failed to ensure that foreign
nationals are notified of their right to consular access when
detained by state and local officials. If consular officials are not
promptly notified when foreign nationals are detained, they are
unable to communicate with their nationals and provide them
with effective assistance. On several occasions, foreign nationals
have raised this treaty violation as a basis for challenging
criminal proceedings. Courts, however, have routinely dismissed
these claims on the grounds that the defendants were not
prejudiced by the failure to adhere to the Vienna Convention or
that they failed to raise the claim in a timely manner. Until
recently, these cases did not receive significant attention, in part,
because they were raised by foreign nationals in the course of
criminal proceedings.
On September 12, 1996, the Republic of Paraguay, the
Paraguayan Ambassador to the United States, and the
Paraguayan Consul General filed an action against Virginia
officials in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
to seek redress for violations of the Vienna Convention and the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation signed between
the United States and Paraguay (Treaty of Friendship).7 The case
arose from the arrest and detention of Angel Breard, a citizen of
Paraguay. Breard was subsequently convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. Despite his detention, Breard was never
notified of his right to consular access under the Vienna
Convention. Similarly, Paraguay was never notified of Breard's
detention under the Treaty of Friendship. Indeed, Paraguay did
not become aware of Breard's detention until well after his
conviction and sentence to death.8 Paraguay subsequently filed
its lawsuit to seek redress for these treaty violations. Specifically,
Paraguay sought declaratory and injunctive relief including an
order declaring Breard's conviction void. The district court
7.

The 1859 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the

United States and Paraguay contains a most favored nation clause with respect to
consular and diplomatic agents. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,
Feb. 4, 1859, U.S.-Para., art. XII, 12 Stat. 1091 [hereinafter Treaty of Friendship].
8.
The desire of the Paraguayan government to assist Breard in these
criminal proceedings is made all the more significant because Paraguay has
abolished the death penalty for all crimes except those committed during wartime
or crimes under military law. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY: LIST OF
ABOLITIONIST AND RETENTIONIST COUNTRIES 3 (1995).

Ironically, U.S. courts have enforced international obligations against
Paraguayan officials for events that took place in Paraguay. See Filartiga v. Pena-

Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing subject matter jurisdiction over
alleged killing perpetrated by Paraguayan police official in Paraguay).
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dismissed the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and

the decision was subsequently affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. 9 A
similar lawsuit was also filed by the Mexican government against
Arizona state officials, and a similar outcome was reached in the
Ninth Circuit.1 0

These cases are unique in several respects.

In contrast to

other cases in which criminal defendants have raised violations of
the Vienna Convention to challenge their underlying criminal
convictions, Paraguay and Mexico petitioned the courts to redress
their own rights under the Vienna Convention. While foreign
governments have been granted access to U.S. courts in the past,
these cases are, perhaps, the first in which foreign governments
have sought to enforce treaty obligations in federal courts. These
cases certainly represent the first time that foreign governments
have petitioned U.S. courts to redress violations of the Vienna
Convention. 1
This Article provides an overview of these unique cases and
the ability of foreign governments to raise treaty violations in
federal courts. Part II examines the Vienna Convention and other
consular agreements, focusing on the right of consular access.
Part III reviews the application of the Vienna Convention by the
United States both at home and abroad. Part IV examines several

Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Va. 1996), affc', 134
9.
F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
10.
United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997).
The issue of whether foreign governments can seek to vindicate
11.

constitutional violations was addressed by Lori Fisler Damrosch. See Loi Fisler
Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483 (1987). She

concluded that foreign sovereigns should be considered "persons" for most legal
purposes. Id. at 557. Federal courts, however, should not extend the benefits of
constitutional jurisprudence to foreign sovereigns when they address the explicit
foreign policy power of the political branches. Id.; see also Lea Brilmayer,
International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277
(1991).
Several articles have examined the right of consular access under the Vienna
Convention. They focus almost exclusively, however, on the implications of these
violations on criminal defendants. See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on ConsularRelations:A Searchfor the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 565 (1997); Victor M. Uribe, Consuls at Work-- Universal Instruments of Human
Rights and ConsularProtection in the Context of CriminalJustice, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
375 (1997); Ronan Doherty, Note, ForeignAffairs v. Federalism:How State Control
of CriminalLaw Implicates FederalResponsibility Under InternationalLaw, 82 VA. L.

REv. 1281 (1996); Robert F. Brooks & William H. Wright Jr., States Deny Treaty

Rights to ForeignDefendants, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1996, at B8; S. Adele Shank &
John Quigley, Foreignerson Texas's Death Row and the Right of Access to Consul,
26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 719 (1995); Gregory Dean Gisvold, Note, Strangers in a Strange
Land.- Assessing the Fate of ForeignNationalsArrested in the United States by State
and Local Authorities, 78 MINN. L. REv. 771 (1994). In addition, the Canadian
Section of Amnesty International prepared a report to assist U.S. attorneys in
obtaining consular assistance in capital cases involving foreign nationals. See
MARK WARREN, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, OBTAINING CONSULAR ASSISTANCE FOR
DEATH-SENTENCED FOREIGN NATIONALS (1996).
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cases in which foreign nationals have raised the failure of state
officials to comply with the Vienna Convention as a basis for
challenging criminal proceedings.
Part V reviews two cases
brought by foreign governments to seek redress for violations of
the Vienna Convention: Paraguayv. Allen1 2 and United Mexican
States v. Woods.13 Part VI then addresses three issues raised by
these cases: (1) when is the United States required to comply
with treaty obligations; (2) whether a foreign government can seek
redress in U.S. courts for treaty violations; and (3) what remedies
are available in U.S. courts for treaty violations. Finally, Part VII
sets forth several recommendations to improve U.S. compliance
with the Vienna Convention and other consular agreements.

II. THE VIENNA

CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS

The importance of consular relations has long been
recognized. 1 4 Indeed, its roots can be traced to the city-states of
ancient Greece.1 s The Greek prostates acted as intermediaries
between Greek colonists and local governments. 1 6 As an effective
political institution, however, the consul did not truly develop
until the dawning of the commercial age during the early Middle
Ages. According to one noted commentary:
In the commercial towns of Italy, Spain, and France the merchants
used to elect one or more of their fellow merchants as arbitrators in
commercial disputes, and these were called juges consuls or consuls
marchands. When, between and after the Crusades, Italian,
Spanish, and French merchants established themselves in Near
Eastern countries, they brought the institution of consuls with
them, merchants from the same nation electing their own consul.
The competence of these consuls became gradually enlarged
through treaties, called "capitulations," between the home states of
the merchants and the mohammedan monarchs in whose territories
they had settled. The competence of consuls came to comprise all
civil and criminal jurisdiction over, and protection of, the privileges,
7
life, and property of their countrymen.

12.
Allen, 134 F.3d 622.
13.
Woods, 126 F.3d 1220.
14.
See LUKE LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 3-7 (2d ed., 1991); 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1132-34 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992); Constantin Economid6s, Consuls, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 770 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1992).
15.
See Economids, supra note 14, at 770.
16.
LEE, supra note 14, at 4.
17.
1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote 14, at 1133.
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Gradually, the consular institution spread to other countries. 1 8
By the twentieth century, consular agreements had been adopted
by numerous countries. 19
In 1949, the International Law Commission designated the
20
subject of consular relations as an area ripe for codification.
However, it did not begin examining the issue until 1955. After
several years of study, the International Law Commission adopted
the Draft Articles on Consular Relations on July 7, 1961.21
Subsequently, the General Assembly announced that it would
convene a conference to prepare an international agreement on
consular relations.2 2 The United Nations Conference on Consular
Relations met in Vienna, Austria, from March 4 until April 22,
1963.23 Over ninety countries as well as several international
organizations attended the Conference.2 4 On April 24, 1963, the
Conference adopted the Vienna Convention and two optional
protocols. 25 The Vienna Convention entered into force on March
19, 1967.26 To date, the Vienna Convention has been ratified by
over 130 countries. 2 7 It has been referred to as "undoubtedly the
single most important event in the entire history of the consular
" 28
institution.
The Vienna Convention defines and guarantees consular
rights, privileges, and duties. Article 5 of the Convention lists a
number of consular functions. These cover a wide variety of

18.
See GRAHAM H. STUART, AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRACTICE
292 (2d ed. 1952).
19.
According to Stuart, approximately 200 treaties contained provisions
concerning consular relations in 1900. Id. This number reached 900 treaties by
1933.

Id. (citing 2 A.H. FELLER & MANLEY 0.

HUDSON, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR

LAWS AND REGULATIONS 1419-72 (1933)).
20.
See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR Intl Law
Comm'n, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at paras. 16 & 20, U.N. Doc A/925 (1949). In
1949, U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie indicated that "in view of the continual
expansion of international trade, the legal position and functions of consuls should
be regulated on as universal a basis as possible." U.N. Secretary General,Survey of
International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law
Commission, at 54-56 (1949).
21.
Report of the International Law Commission, U.N Doc. A/4843

(1961).
22.
23.
24.

Vienna Convention, supranote 2, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262 n. 1.
Id.
Id.

25.
The optional protocols were the Optional Protocol Concerning
Acquisition of Nationality and the Optional Protocol Concerning Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes. Id.

26.

Id. Article 77 of the Vienna Convention provided that it shall enter into

force "on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second
instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United

Nations." Id. art. 77, para. 1.
27.
Louis HENKIN ET AL., THE BASIC DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1993).

28.

LEE, supra note 14, at 27.
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responsibilities, including:
furthering the development of
commercial, economic, cultural, and scientific relations between
the sending state and the receiving state; issuing passports and
travel documents; serving as a notary and civil registrar;
transmitting judicial and extra-judicial documents or executing
letters rogatory or commissions to take evidence for the courts of
the sending state; and exercising rights of supervision and
inspection of vessels and aircraft of the sending state. 2 9 One of
the most important responsibilities of the consul is to protect the
nationals of the sending state. Article 5(e) provides that consular
functions include "helping and assisting nationals, both
30
individuals and bodies corporate, of the sending State."
The Vienna Convention recognizes that communication is
essential for facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating
to nationals of the sending state. Article 36(l)(a) provides that
consular officials shall be free to communicate with, and have
access to, nationals of the sending state. 3 1 Similarly, nationals of
the sending state shall have the same freedom with respect to
communication with and access to consular officers of the
sending state. 32
A sensitive issue arises when a foreign national is detained by
the receiving state. Article 36(l)(b) provides that the competent
authorities of the receiving state shall, without delay, inform a
national of his right to notify the consular post that he has been
detained:3
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending

trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication

addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in

prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph; 3 4

29.
Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 5.
30.
Id. art. 5, para. 8.
31.
Id art. 36, para. l(a). The final text of Article 36 was the subject of
extensive debate during the U.N. Conference. The International Law Commission
originally proposed a provision that would require the receiving state to notify
consular officials without undue delay that a national had been detained. Several
countries, however, expressed concern over such an expansive provision and so it
was not added to the text. As a result, the final version of Article 36 was not
completed until two days before the Conference concluded.
See generally
Information Series, United Nations Conference on ConsularRelations, U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.25/hif.1 (1963).
32.
Vienna Convention, supranote 2, art. 36, para. 1(a).
33.
Id. art. 36, para. 1(b).
34.
Id.
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Article 36(1)(c) grants consular officers the right to visit, converse,
who is in detention and to
and correspond with a national 35
arrange for his legal representation:
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse
and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation.
They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending
State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in
pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall
refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who isa 6in prison,
custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action

Finally, Article 36(2) provides that the laws and regulations of 3the
7
receiving state must allow full effect to be given to these rights:
The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws
and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes
8
for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended

This obligation is also found in Article 14 which declares that the
receiving state shall "ensure that the necessary measures are
taken to enable the head of a consular post to carry out the duties
of his office and to3 9have the benefit of the provisions of the
present Convention."

In addition to the Vienna Convention, numerous countries
have entered bilateral agreements with respect to consular
relations. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union
signed a bilateral Consular Convention in 1964 to regulate
While the
consular relations between the two countries. 4 °
respects,
in
several
Convention
agreement mirrors the Vienna

there are significant differences.

In contrast to the Vienna

Convention, the Consular Convention requires the receiving state

Id. art. 36, para. 1(c).
35.
Id.
36.
Id. art. 36, para. 2; see also Report of the International Law
37.
Commission, U.N. GAOR Intl Law Comm'n, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 24, U.N.
Doc. A/4843 (1961).
Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36, para. 2. Prior to the approval
38.
of Article 36(2), the Soviet Union proposed an amendment which would have
permitted a country's domestic law to impair the rights set forth in Article 36(1).
According to the Soviet delegate, Article 36(2) could force states to alter their
criminal laws and allow consular officials to interfere with the legal process in
U.N. GAOR,
order to protect aliens. The amendment was not approved.
Conference on Consular Relations, 12th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 10, para. 2-9, U.N
Doc. A/CONF.25/SR.12, 17 (1963), at 1.
39.
Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 14.
Consular Convention, June 1, 1964, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 19 U.S.T. 5018.
40.
The United States has entered similar agreements with several other countries
including China and the United Kingdom. See Convention Regarding Consular
Officers, June 6, 1951, U.S.-U.K., 3 U.S.T. 3426; Agreement on Consular
Relations, Jan. 31, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C. 30 U.S.T. 17.
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to notify consular officials regardless of the desires of the detained
national. Article 12(2) provides that "[tihe appropriate authorities
of the receiving state shall immediately inform a consular officer
of the sending state about the arrest or detention in other form of
a national of the sending state."4 1 The Protocol to the Consular
Convention adds that such notification must take place within
one to three days from the time of arrest or detention depending
on conditions of communication. 42 Article 12(3) provides that "[a]
consular officer of the sending state shall have the right without
delay to visit and communicate with a national of the sending
state who is under arrest or otherwise detained in custody or is
serving a sentence of imprisonment."4
The Protocol adds that
the right of the consular officer to visit and communicate with a
national "shall be accorded within two to four days of the arrest or
detention of such national depending upon his location." 44
Countries have also signed supplementary agreements
addressing consular relations. For example, the United States
and Mexico signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Consular
Protection of Mexican and United States Nationals on May 7,
1996. 4 s The memorandum identified the need to foster and
strengthen communication between consular officials and local
authorities. 4 6 Accordingly, the memorandum provided that the
United States and Mexico would adopt the following principles
and measures:
1. To include within the mandate of the Working Group on
Migration and Consular Affairs of the Binational Commission, the

discussion and evaluation of issues, problems and trends related to
the consular protection and human rights of nationals of both
countries and the understandings expressed in this memorandum
as regular matters on its agenda, in order to make
recommendations to the respective Governments, if mutually agreed
upon.
2. To provide any individual detained by migration authorities with

notice of his/her legal rights and options, including the right to
contact his/her consular representatives, and to facilitate

41.

Consular Convention, supra note 40, art. 12.

42.
Id. Protocol, cl. 1.
43.
Id. art. 12.
44.
Id. Protocol, cl. 2.
45.
Memorandum of Understanding on Consular Protection of Mexican
and United States Nationals, completed on May 7, 1996, Dept. of State File
No. P96 0065-0984/0987 [hereinafter Memorandum on Consular Protection].
The memorandum was signed at the conclusion of the Binational Commission,
an annual cabinet-level meeting between the United States and Mexico.
Daniel Dombey, Mexico-U.S. Accords Made, FIN. TIMES, May 9, 1996, at 11.
Along with the memorandum, several accords were signed on issues ranging
from education and health to border control and the environment. Mark
Fineman & Stanley Meisler, U.S., Mexico Sign Pact on Migrants, Drugs,
Pollution, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1996, at Al.

46.

Memorandum on Consular Protection, supra note 45.
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communication between consular representatives and their
nationals. Both Governments will endeavor, consistent with the
relevant laws of each country, to ensure that specific notification to
consular representatives is given in cases involving the detention of
minors, pregnant women and people at risk.
3. To endeavor to provide settings conducive to full and free
exchange between consular representatives and detained
individuals in order to allow, consistent with the relevant laws of
each country, consular officials to interview their respective

nationals when they are detained, arrested, incarcerated or held in
custody in accordance with Article VI, paragraph 2, section (c) of the
Consular Convention between the United Mexican States and the
United States of America of August 12, 1942, and in accordance
with Article 36, first paragraph, of the Vienna Convention on

Consular Relations of 1963.
4. To allow and to facilitate, consistent with the relevant laws of
each country, consular officials to be present at all times at the
trials or judicial procedures concerning their respective nationals,
including those legal procedures relating to minors. 7

Finally, the United States has also entered into agreements
that contain a most favored nation clause with respect to
consular and diplomatic agents. Most favored nation treatment is
an obligation to treat a state no less favorably than any other
state. Thus, these agreements require the United States to treat
the consular officials of signatory countries no less favorably than
consular officials from other countries. For example, the 1859
Treaty of Friendship between the United States and Paraguay
contains a most favored nation clause with respect to consular
and diplomatic agents. 48 Article XII provides that "the Diplomatic
Agents and Consuls of the Republic of Paraguay in the United
States of America shall enjoy whatever privileges, exemptions and
immunities are, or may be, there granted to Agents of any other
Nation whatever." 4 9 This obligation requires the United States to
grant Paraguayan consular officials the same rights and privileges
provided to consular officials from any other country.
While bilateral and supplementary agreements are important,
the Vienna Convention remains the principal framework for
consular relations between signatory states.

III. THE APPLICATION OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION

BY THE UNITED STATES
On April 24, 1963, the United States signed the Vienna
Convention. 5 0 The treaty was not immediately submitted to the

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Treaty of Friendship, supranote 7, art. XII.
Id.
Vienna Convention, supranote 2.
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Senate for review, however, because the Executive Branch initially
decided to use bilateral consular agreements rather than the
multilateral Vienna Convention. 5 ' The Nixon Administration
finally sought ratification of the Vienna Convention because it
believed the agreement "constitutes an important contribution to
the development and codification of international law and should
contribute to the orderly and effective conduct of consular
52
relations between States.
The true impact of the Vienna Convention was revealed when
the Nixon Administration formally submitted the treaty to the

Senate -for its advice and consent to ratification in May 1969. In
hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, J.
Edward Lyerly, the Deputy Legal Adviser for the Nixon
Administration, said the treaty was "entirely self-executive [sic]
and does not require any implementing or complementing
legislation."5 3 Subsequently, Senator J. William Fulbright asked
Deputy Legal Adviser Lyerly whether the Vienna Convention
would affect federal legislation or state laws.5 4 In response, the
Deputy Legal Adviser stated that "[t]he Vienna Convention does
not have the effect of overcoming Federal or State laws beyond the
scope long authorized in existing consular conventions."5 5 He
added, however, that, '[to the extent that there are conflicts in
Federal legislation or State laws [,] the Vienna Convention, after
ratification, would govern as in the case of bilateral consular
conventions."5 6 Moreover, the Senate fully recognized that state
and local jurisdictions were required to provide consular
notification when a foreign national was detained.5 7 The Senate
requested the Nixon Administration to describe how the State
Department notifies state and local jurisdictions about consular
5
agreements. 8
The Senate subsequently approved the Vienna Convention on
October 22, 1969, and it was formally ratified by President Nixon
on November 12, 1969.5 9 The ratification was deposited on

51.

52.

115 CONG. REc. S30,953 (1969).

Ex. E, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at VII (Statement of Secretary of State

William Rogers) (1969).
53.
S. Exac. REP. No. 91-9, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 & 5 (appendix)
(statement by Deputy Legal Adviser J. Edward Lyerly) (1969).
54.
Id. at 18.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 24.
58.
Id.
59.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 2; see also Treaty Information:
Current Actions, 61 DEP'T ST. BULL. 574 (1969), reprinted in Recent Actions
Regarding Treaties to Which the United States is a Party, 9 I.L.M. 222-24
(1970).
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November 24, 1969, and it entered into force for the United States
on December 24, 1969.60
The following sections examine the application of the Vienna
Convention by the United States both abroad and at home.
A. The Application of the Vienna Convention Abroad
The United States has long recognized the importance of
consular access abroad. Prior to the Vienna Convention, the
United States submitted formal protests to foreign governments
for their failure to allow consular access to detained U.S.
nationals. 6 1 For example, in 1924, a U.S. consular official in
Germany experienced difficulties in visiting a U.S. citizen in
prison. 62 The State Department instructed the U.S. Embassy in
Germany to communicate to German officials that:
this Government considers that American Consular Officers in
Germany should be granted, in accordance with what it believes to
be the accepted international practice, the courtesy of conferring
with American citizens in prison in that country in order that the
Consular Officers may render them the assistance to which they
may be entitled; that these Officers should be permitted in such
cases to converse with the prisoners in the English language and
without the presence of a German official; and that it is hoped that
any German regulations placing restrictions upon persons visiting
German prisons will not be construed as applying to American
63
Consular Officers.

The U.S. Ambassador to Germany subsequently notified the State
Department that German authorities had been instructed "to
grant consuls of the United States, when practicable, admittance
to prisoners of their nationality, as well as interviews with such
prisoners
6 4 in the English language without the presence of a police

official."

60.
See Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which the United States is a
Party, supranote 59, at 224.
61.
For several examples of U.S. protests to foreign governments for
their refusal to allow access to detained American nationals, see 4 GREEN
HAYWOOD HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 830-37 (1942). For more
recent examples, see Jim Wolf, U.S. Says Iraq Denies Access to U.S. Prisoners,
REUTERS, Apr. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File;
Matthew Campbell, American Pilot Might Be Tried in Nicaraguan War Crimes
Court, REUTERS, Dec. 11, 1987, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD
File.

62.

4 HACKWORTH, supranote 61, at 831.

Joseph Grew, The Under Secretary of State to the Charg6 d'Affaires
63.
ad interim, no. 3523, Sept. 29, 1924, MS. Dep't of State, file 362.1121
Stroyman, David, reprintedin 4 HACKWORTH, supra note 61, at 83 1.
64.
Jacob G. Schurman, Ambassador Schurman to Secretary Kellogg, no.
54, July 18, 1925, MS. Dep't of State, file 362.1121 Stroyman, David, reprinted in 4
HAcKWORTH, supranote 61, at 831.
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Following the ratification of the Vienna Convention by the
United States, the State Department stressed the importance of
consular access as codified in Article 36 of the Convention. In an
October 1973 memorandum, the State Department noted that:
[i]n the Department's view, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
contains obligations of the highest order and should not be dealt
with lightly. Article 36, paragraph l(b) requires the authorities of
the receiving state to notify the consular post of the sending state
without delay of the arrest or commitment of a national of the
sending state, if that national so requests. While there is no precise
definition of "without delay," it is the Department's view that such
notification should take place as quickly as possible and, in any
event, no later than the passage of a few days. s

Since the United States ratified the Vienna Convention, the
State Department has regularly referred to Article 36 when
discussing
the
right
of consular
access
with
foreign

governments. 66 For example, in 1975, two American citizens were
detained by Syrian security forces. Despite repeated requests,
Syrian officials refused U.S. consular officials access to the
detained nationals.
The State Department notified the U.S.
Embassy in Damascus to inform the Syrian government of the
importance of consular access. 6 7
According to the State
Department, the right of consular access is well established under
the Vienna Convention, customary international law, bilateral
agreements between the United States and Syria, and by
humanitarian considerations. 6"
The State Department added
that:
The recognition of these rights is prompted in part by
considerations of reciprocity. States accord these rights to other
states in the confident expectation that if the situation were to be
reversed they would be accorded equivalent rights to protect their
nationals. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic can be
confident that if its nationals were detained in the United States the
appropriate Syrian officials would be promptly notified and allowed
prompt access to these nationals. 9

65.
U.S. Dep't of State File L/M/SCA, reprintedin Arthur Rovine, U.S. Dep't
of State, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 161 (1973).
66.
See also U.S. Dep't of State File No. P77 0095-2225, reprinted in JOHN
BOYD, U.S. DEP!T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

290 (1977) (describing diplomatic correspondence between the U.S. Embassy in
San Salvador and the El Salvadoran Ministry of Foreign Relations regarding
compliance with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention).
67.
U.S. Dept of State telegram 40298 to Embassy Damascus, Feb. 21,
1975, reprinted in ELEANOR McDOWELL, U.S. DEP'T OF STATi, DIGiS'r O1." UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1975).
68.
Id. at 249-50.
69.
Id.
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Following its formal request to the Syrian government, American
officials were granted proper access to the detained
consular 70
nationals.
In November 1979, Iranian students occupied the U.S.

Embassy in Tehran and detained a large number of U.S. citizens.
During the crisis, U.S. consular and diplomatic officials were
prevented from communicating with the detained U.S. nationals.
The United States repeatedly referred to the Vienna Convention in
condemning the Iranian actions and in requesting immediate
access to the U.S. nationals. On November 29, 1979, the United
States instituted proceedings against Iran in the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).7 1 In its application to the ICJ, the United
States indicated that Iran's government had violated the Vienna
Convention by failing to allow U.S. consular personnel to
In its Order of
communicate with other U.S. nationals.
15,
1979, the ICJ
Provisional Measures of December
acknowledged the importance of the Vienna Convention and the
right of consular access. It stated that:
[T]he unimpeded conduct of consular relations, which have also
been established between peoples since ancient times, is no less
important in the context of present-day international law, in
promoting the development of friendly relations among nations, and
ensuring protection and assistance for aliens resident in the
territories of other States; and whereas therefore the privileges and
immunities of consular officers and consular employees, and the
inviolability of consular premises and archives, are similarly
principles deep-rooted in international law7 2

In its Final Judgment, the ICJ held that Iran had violated several
international conventions, including the Vienna Convention, as
well as customary international law.73 It called upon Iran to
make reparations to the United States for these violations.
To protect U.S. citizens abroad, the State Department has

issued instructions to all Foreign Service posts regarding detained
nationals and the right of consular access. Chapter 400 of the
Foreign Affairs Manual concerns the arrest and detention of U.S.
The introduction notes "one of the basic
citizens abroad.
functions of a consular officer is to provide a 'cultural bridge'
between the host community and the officer's own compatriots
traveling or residing abroad." "No one needs that cultural bridge

McDOWELL, supra note 67, at 251.
70.
United States Application and Request for Interim Measures of
71.
Protection in Proceeding Against Iran (U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran), reprintedin 18 I.L.M. 145-46 (1979).
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
72.
Tehran (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures), reprinted in 19 I.L.M.
139, 145-46 (1980).
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
73.
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of May 24).
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more than the individual U.S. citizen who has been arrested in a
foreign country or imprisoned in a foreign jail." 74 With respect to
consular notification, the Foreign Affairs Manual provides: "In
order for the consular official to perform the protective function in
an efficient and timely manner, it is essential that the consul
obtain prompt notification whenever a U.S. citizen is arrested.
Prompt notification is necessary to assure early access to the
arrestee." 75 Indeed, the Foreign Affairs Manual adds that U.S.
consular officials should file a formal protest whenever a host
government fails to inform consular
officials within seventy-two
76
hours of the arrest of a U.S. citizen.
The Foreign Affairs Manual also describes the importance of
prompt access to detained nationals. 7 7 Prompt access assures
both the national and the host government of U.S. government
interest in the case. 78 It allows consular officials to document
potential instances of abuse. 7 9 It also permits consular officials
to provide detained nationals with information pertaining to the
80
legal system of the host government and with a list of lawyers.
Finally, it allows consular officials to ensure that detained
nationals are treated fairly and without prejudice to their
nationality.8 1
B. The Application of the Vienna Convention in the United States

While the U.S. government has consistently affirmed the
importance of consular access abroad, the recent application of
this treaty obligation in the United States has been sparse. This
is surprising, given that the United States has long recognized a
general obligation to provide consular access to detained
82
nationals in the United States.
74.

7 U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 491 (1984).

75.
76.

d. § 411.
Id. § 415.4-1.

77.
Id. § 412.
78.
I&
79.
Id- § 414.2.
80.
I& § 412. According to the Manual, "[t]he purpose of this material is
not to usurp the function of legal counsel or encourage a 'do it yourself approach.
Rather, it serves the purpose of helping arrestees understand what is happening to
them and provides a yardstick against which they can measure an attorney's
performance." I& § 413.4.
81.
I& § 431.
82.
In 1934, the State Department urged the governor of California to
permit a Mexican consul to visit a Mexican citizen that was detained in a California
jail. According to the State Department:
Even in the absence of applicable treaty provisions this Government has
always insisted that its consuls be permitted to visit American citizens
imprisoned throughout the world and it is believed that if [this] attitude [of
the] District Attorney is maintained in the instant case there will be
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In 1967, the United States promulgated regulations to
establish a uniform procedure for consular notification when
nationals of foreign countries are arrested by officers of the
Department of Justice or the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS).
With respect to the Department of Justice, the United States
codified the obligation of consular access at 28 C.F.R. Section
50.5.83 This section provides:
(1) In every case in which a foreign national is arrested the arresting
officer shall inform the foreign national that his consul will be
advised of his arrest unless he does not wish such notification to be
given. If the foreign national does not wish to have his consul
notified, the arresting officer shall also inform him that in the event
there is a treaty in force between the United States and his country
which requires such notification, his consul must be notified
regardless of his wishes and, if such is the case, he will be advised
of such notification by the U.S. Attorney.
(2) In all cases (including those where the foreign national has
stated that he does not wish his consul to be notified) the local office
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the local Marshal's office,
as the case may be, shall inform the nearest U.S. Attorney of the
arrest and of the arrested person's wishes regarding consular
notification.
(3) The U.S. Attorney shall then notify the appropriate consul except
where he has been informed that the foreign national does not
desire such notification to be made. However, if there is a treaty
provision in effect which requires notification of consul, without
reference to a demand or request of the arrested national, the
consul shall be notified even if the arrested person has asked that
he not be notified. In such case, the U.S. Attorney shall advise the
foreign national that his consul has been notified and inform him
4
that notification was necessary because of the treaty obligation.

With respect to the INS, the United States codified the obligation
of consular access at 8 C.F.R. Section 236.1(e). This regulation
was originally promulgated in 196785 and was most recently
amended in 1997.86 It provides:
Every detained alien shall be notified that he or she may
communicate with the consular or diplomatic officers of the country
of his or her nationality in the United States. Existing treaties with

repercussions in Mexico and perhaps other countries unfavorable to
American citizens. It is earnestly requested that you take prompt action
looking to reversal [sic] District Attorney's position.
Cordell Hull, Secretary of State to Governor Rolph, telegram of Apr. 10, 1934, MS.
Dep't of State File 311.1221 Aragon, Jos6/3, reprintedin 4 HACKWORTH, supra note
61, at 836-37.
83.
Notification of Consular Officers Upon Arrest of Foreign Nationals, 32
Fed. Reg. 1040 (1967).
84.
Id.
Proceedings to Determine Deportability of Aliens in the United States:
85.
Apprehension, Custody Hearing and Appeal, 32 Fed. Reg. 5619 (1967).
Apprehension and Detention of Inadmissable and Deportable Aliens;
86.
Removal of Aliens Ordered Removed, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10360 (1997).
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the following countries require immediate communication with
appropriate consular or diplomatic officers whenever nationals of
the following countries are detained in removal proceedings,
whether or not requested by the alien and even if the alien requests
that no communication be undertaken in his or her behalf. When
notifying consular or diplomatic officials, Service officers shall not
reveal the fact that any detained alien has applied for asylum or
87
withholding of removal

This section codifies two distinct obligations. First, INS officials
are obligated to inform a detained alien of his right to
communicate with consular or diplomatic officials.8 8
By its
terms, this provision applies to all detained aliens regardless of
nationality. Thus, the provision complies with the obligation of
consular access under Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention.
Second, INS officials are required to notify consular officials when
nationals from specified countries are detained in exclusion or
expulsion proceedings even if the aliens request that no such
notification take place.8 9 In contrast to the previous obligation,
this provision only applies to detained aliens from countries with
which the United States has negotiated special arrangements on
consular notification.
In cases where the INS has made an arrest for violations of
the criminal provisions of the immigration laws, the U.S. Marshal,
upon delivery of the foreign national into his custody, shall be
responsible for informing the U.S. Attorney of the arrest in
accordance with 28 C.F.R. Section 50.5(a)(2).
To promote compliance with the Vienna Convention by state
and local governments, the State Department began issuing
periodic notices on consular access to these agencies. 90 The
notice is mailed to the governor and attorney general of each of

87.
Id. The following countries are listed: Albania, Antigua, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Brunei, Bulgaria, China (People's
Republic of), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia,
Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Hungary, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Nigeria, Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent/Grenadines, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South
Korea, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad/Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., Uzbekistan, Zambia.
Arrangements made with Albania provide that U.S. authorities shall notify
responsible representatives within 72 hours of the arrest or detention of one of
their nationals. When Taiwan nationals (who carry "Republic of China" passports)
are detained, authorities should notify the nearest office of the Taiwan Economic
and Cultural Representative's Office, the unofficial entity representing Taiwan's
interests in the United States. Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
U.S. Dep't of State, Notice for Law Enforcement Officials on Detention of
Foreign Nationals (1993).
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the fifty states as well as to the mayors of cities with populations
exceeding 100,000 people. The notice provides:
The U.S. Department of State wishes to remind all law enforcement

personnel that, whenever they arrest or otherwise detain a foreign
national in the United States, there may be a legal obligation to
notify diplomatic or consular representatives of that person's
government in this country. Compliance with the notification
requirement is essential to ensure that similar notice is given to
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers when U.S. citizens are
arrested or detained abroad? 1

The notice then sets forth the obligations for law enforcement
officials with respect to the detention of foreign nationals. It
provides that all detained nationals must be notified of their right
to contact and communicate with consular officials. It indicates
that this requirement is provided by the Vienna Convention and

customary international law. In addition, the notice recognizes
that the United States has entered bilateral agreements with

certain countries requiring notification of consular officials even if
the alien requests that no such notification take place. Finally,
the notice provides a current list of embassies and consulates in
the United States, including their addresses and telephone
92
numbers.
It should be noted, however, that the State Department
notice itself is not binding upon state or local officials. Proper
notification of the right of consular access by these government
officials depends upon their individual application. Accordingly,
notification is seldom provided at the state or local level. In
response, several criminal defendants have challenged state
criminal proceedings because of the failure of state and local
officials to notify them of their right to consular access under the
Vienna Convention.

IV. FOREIGN NATIONALS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION

The following Part examines cases in which defendants have
challenged legal proceedings because law enforcement officials
failed to notify them of their right to consular access.

91.

X at 1.

92.

Id. at Annex.
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A. Cases Brought Under FederalRegulations
Several aliens have challenged immigration proceedings
because INS officials failed to adhere to federal regulations on
93
consular access.
1. United States v. Calderon-Medina
In United States v. Calderon-Medina, an alien sought to

dismiss an indictment for illegal entry after deportation, arguing
that the INS had failed to advise him of his right to consult with
94
Mexican consular authorities as required by INS regulations.
The Ninth Circuit indicated that the INS regulations were
intended to ensure compliance with the Vienna Convention. It
held that violation of the regulation "renders a deportation
unlawful only if the violation prejudiced interests of the alien
which were protected by the regulation." 95 The court determined
that the alien had failed to demonstrate prejudice.
2. United States v. Rangel-Gonzales
In United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, a companion case to
Calderon-Medina, an alien sought to dismiss his indictment for
illegal entry after deportation arguing the INS had failed to advise
96
him of his right to consult with Mexican consular authorities.
Applying the test set forth in Calderon-Medina, the Ninth Circuit
found that the alien had made a credible showing of prejudice:
The appellant showed he did not know of his right to contact the
consular officials, that he would have done so had he known, and
that such consultation may well have led not merely to appointment
of counsel, but also to community assistance in creating a more
favorable record to present to the immigration judge on the question
97
of deportation

93.
See, e.g., United States v. Ibarra, 3 F.3d 1333, 1335 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Zaleta-Sosa, 854 F.2d 48, 52 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Cerda-Pena, 799 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. ArambulaAlvarado, 677 F.2d 51, 52 (9th Cir. 1982); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726

(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 82 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Hemandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. ArangoChairez, 875 F. Supp. 609, 616 (D. Neb. 1994); United States v. Floulis, 457 F.
Supp. 1350, 1355 (W.D. Pa 1978).
94.
591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
95.
Id. at 531.
96.
617 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1980).
97.
Id. at 531.
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Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the indictment should be
dismissed.

3. Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
In Waldron v. Immigrationand NaturalizationService, an alien

sought judicial review of a deportation order.9 8 As a citizen of
Trinidad, Waldron argued that the failure of the INS to notify him
of his right to contact diplomatic officials pursuant to INS
The Second Circuit
regulations was cause for reversal. 9 9
established a two-part test concerning the consequences of INS
failure to comply with its own regulations.
[WMhen a regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right
derived from the Constitution or a federal statute, and the INS fails
to adhere to it, the challenged deportation proceeding is invalid and
a remand to the agency is required.... On the other hand, where
an INS regulation does not affect fundamental rights derived from
the Constitution or a federal statute, we believe it is best to
invalidate a challenged proceeding only upon a showing of prejudice
to the rights sought to be protected by the subject regulation~0°

Applying this framework, the court first determined that 8 C.F.R.
Section 242.2(g) (predecessor regulation to 8 C.F.R. Section
236. 1(e)) did not implicate fundamental rights of constitutional or
federal statutory origins. The court recognized that Section
242.2(g) was adopted to ensure compliance with the Vienna
Convention. It noted, however, that "[a]lthough compliance with
our treaty obligations clearly is required, we decline to equate
such a provision with fundamental rights, such as the right to
10 1
counsel, which traces its origins to concepts of due process."

The court then determined that Waldron had failed to identify any
prejudicial impact arising from the INS's failure to notify him of
his right to consular access.
In sum, federal courts have determined that a violation of INS

regulations with respect to consular
challenged
prejudice. 1

2

access will invalidate

proceedings only if the defendant can show
The courts have made this determination despite

98.
Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 511 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 514.
99.
100. Id. at 518.
101. Id.
102. Compare these cases with the Italian case In re Yater, 77 INT'L L. REP.
541 (1988). In this 1973 case, a British national was arrested and brought to trial
without the notification of British consular officials. The British national argued
that the proceedings instituted against him were a nullity because of the failure to
comply with the Vienna Convention. The Italian Court of Cassation found there
was no violation. The court argued that consular notification and assistance at
trial is a "complementary and subsidiary intervention which does not replace the
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the fact that no such requirement is set forth in the Vienna
Convention.
B. Cases Brought Under the Vienna Convention
In addition to cases involving federal regulations, defendants
have challenged criminal proceedings because law enforcement
officials failed to notify them of their right to consular access
under the Vienna Convention.
1. Faulder v. Johnson
In Faulder v. Johnson, the defendant petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus following his conviction and sentence of death in
Texas.103 As a Canadian citizen, the defendant argued that his
conviction should be reversed because Texas failed to adhere to
the Vienna Convention. Specifically, state officials failed to notify
the defendant of his right to consular access. 1° 4 Indeed, the
Canadian government did not learn of the defendant's
incarceration for fifteen years.'10 The district court dismissed the
habeas petition and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court of Appeals recognized that the Vienna Convention had
been violated.1 6 The court noted, however, that:

accused's right to provide for himself a trusted legal representative for his defence."
Id. at 542; see also 2 ITALIAN Y.B. OF INT'L L. 336 (1976) (discussing the Yater case).

103.

104.

81 F.3d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1996).

The Canadian government filed an amicus brief in federal court

supporting Faulder's challenge to the state court proceedings. Amicus Brief of the
Government of Canada, Faulder v. Collins (No. 95-40512) (E.D. Tex. 1993).
According to the Canadian government, Faulder "was deprived of a right under
international law that may have prejudiced his ability to receive a fair trial and
sentencing hearing." Id. at 10. Specifically, it argued that:
If Mr. Faulder had been given an opportunity to contact the Canadian
Consulate General in Dallas, he would have been visited by a Canadian
consul. The consul would have offered to contact Mr. Faulder's family in
Canada and inform them of his situation. They in turn could have provided
information concerning Mr. Faulder's medical and mental history that
could have been material to his defense. The consul would also have been
able to provide him with a list of local lawyers he could contact. During Mr.
Faulder's incarceration, the consul would have provided Mr. Faulder with
assistance on non-legal issues which he could not have received from his
attorney. Consuls are specifically trained and instructed to provide such
unique assistance to persons in Mr. Faulder's situation.
Id at 9-10.
105.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of Canada in Support of an
Application for the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex ParteFaulder, at 3 (Tex. Crim. App.,
May 23, 1997).
106.
Faulder,81 F.3d at 520.
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Faulder or Faulder's attorney had access to all of the information
that could have been obtained by the Canadian government. While
we in no way approve of Texas' failure to advise Faulder, the
evidence that would have been obtained by the Canadian
authorities is merely the same as or cumulative of evidence defense
07
counsel had or could have obtained.

Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the violation of the Vienna
Convention did not merit reversal of the conviction.10 8

2. Murphy v. Netherland
In Murphy v. Netherland, Mario Murphy, a Mexican national,
had been arrested and charged with murder in Virginia.' 0 9 He
subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death. 110 At
no time was he notified of his right to consular access under the
Vienna Convention."' After his state appeals were denied by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, Murphy filed a petition for habeas
corpus in federal district court alleging numerous challenges to
his conviction including failure to comply with the Vienna
Convention.
The district court denied Murphy's claims and
dismissed the petition. With respect to his claims arising under
the Vienna Convention, the court first noted its concern over
"what appears to be Virginia's defiant and continuing disregard
for the Vienna Convention." 1 12 Yet, the court failed to find a
violation that would permit habeas relief. Referring to the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Faulder,the district court said that Murphy
failed to prove he had been prejudiced by Virginia's failure to
comply with the provisions of the Vienna Convention.
More
significantly, the district court held that Murphy's claim was
procedurally invalid since he had never raised the argument in
the Virginia state courts.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit denied the motion for a
1 13
certificate of appealability and dismissed Murphy's petition.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
a petitioner whose habeas petition is denied by a district court
must make "a substantial showing of the denial of a

107. Id
108. The Canadian government also filed an amicus brief in Faulder's
state habeas appeal. Amicus Brief, Faulder.
109. Murphyv. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997).

110.

Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136 (1993).

111. Indeed, when Murphy petitioned Virginia authorities for communication
with Mexican consular authorities, his request was denied. It was not until the
Mexican consul learned of Murphy's detention on his own that he was able to
communicate with Murphy. Amicus Brief of the United Mexican States, Murphy v.
Netherland, Case No. 96-14, at 18-19 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 1997).
112. Memorandum Opinion, Murphy v. Netherland (No. 3, 95-CV-856) at 7.
113. Murphy, 116 F.3d at 101.
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constitutional right."11 4 In dismissing the appeal, the court first
determined that a violation of the Vienna Convention did not
violate any constitutional right: "Just as a state does not violate a
constitutional right merely by violating a federal statute, it does
115
not violate a constitutional right merely by violating a treaty."
Second, the court affirmed that Murphy's claim was procedurally
barred because he did not raise it in state court, and he could not
show cause for his default. According to the Court of Appeals,
"f[t]reaties are one of the first sources that would be consulted by
a reasonably diligent counsel representing a foreign national."1 16
While Virginia officials had failed to notify Murphy of his rights

under the Vienna Convention, such action did not prejudice
Murphy from raising the claim on his own: "The legal basis for
the Vienna Convention claim could, as noted above, have been
discovered upon a reasonably diligent investigation by his
attorney, and the factual predicate for that claim-that Murphy is
a
citizen
of Mexico-was
obviously
within
Murphy's
knowledge." 11 7 Third, the court found that Murphy had failed to
establish any prejudice arising from the alleged violation of the
Vienna Convention. Specifically, Murphy had failed to prove that
"the consulate could have helped him either obtain a plea bargain
1 18
or obtain mitigating evidence for the sentencing hearing."
Finally, the court dismissed Murphy's claim that his guilty plea
was involuntary because of the state's failure to advise him of his
rights under the Vienna Convention. According to the court, this
claim was not even raised in the federal habeas petition.
Moreover, it did not constitute a claimed violation of a
constitutional right.
For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit
refused to grant Murphy's motion for a certificate of appealability
and, therefore, dismissed Murphy's appeal.
Following an unsuccessful petition to the U.S. Supreme
Court and after his plea for clemency was denied by the governor
of Virginia, Murphy was executed on September 17, 1997.
3. Breard v. Netherland
In Breard v. Netherland, Angel Breard, a Paraguayan
national, was arrested and subsequently convicted and sentenced
to death in Virginia. 1 19 Breard's conviction and sentence were
affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court. After exhausting his

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 100-101.
Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68 (1994).
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state appeals, Breard filed a federal habeas corpus petition
challenging his conviction and death sentence. Breard argued
that Virginia officials had never informed him of his right to
consular access under the Vienna Convention.
As in the Murphy case, the district court denied Breard's
claims and dismissed the petition. 120 While the district court
expressed its concern over Virginia's persistent refusal to abide by
the Vienna Convention, it held that a violation of these rights was
In addition, the district court
insufficient to permit relief.
indicated that Breard had never raised the issue in state court
and, therefore, he could not raise it in federal court. According to
the district court:
the Commonwealth's failure to comply with the Vienna Convention
did not prevent Breard's counsel from raising the issue during state
proceedings. The only predicate fact required to raise the claim was
the knowledge of Breard's foreign nationality. The legal knowledge

required to raise the claim is imputed to Breard through the various
during the trial, direct appeal, and
attorneys who represented12him
1
state habeas proceedings.

On January 22, 1998, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling.' 22 The court's decision was guided by its earlier
ruling in Murphy v. Netherland. First, the court found that
Murphy forecloses any argument that Breard could not have
raised his Vienna Convention claim at the time he filed his initial
state habeas petition in May 1995. "In reaching this conclusion,
we noted that a reasonably diligent attorney would have
discovered the applicability of the Vienna Convention to a foreign
national defendant and that in previous cases claims under the

Vienna Convention have been raised ...

."123

Second, the court

determined that it could not address Breard's defaulted Vienna
Convention claim unless he could "demonstrate cause for the
default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of
federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim will
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." 12 4 In order to
demonstrate cause for the default, a petitioner must establish
that some external factor impeded his ability to raise the claim
during the state proceedings. Again, the court found that the
Murphy decision precluded Breard from arguing that the basis of
the Vienna Convention claim was unavailable to him when he
filed his state habeas petition. Finally, the Court found that the
Vienna Convention claim did not provide any basis for the

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996).
Id at 1263.
Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 619-20.
Id. at 620.
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miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default doctrine.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affinmed the district court's ruling
to dismiss Breard's writ of habeas corpus.
In a concurring opinion, Senior Circuit Judge Butzner wrote
to emphasize the importance of the Vienna Convention. He noted
that the agreement was clearly self-executing, and that the rights
conferred by the agreement must be honored by the federal
government as well as the individual states. Indeed, these rights
must be implemented before trial, at a time when they can be
appropriately addressed. "Collateral review is too limited to afford
an adequate remedy." 12 5 More significantly, Judge Butzner
emphasized the broad nature of such international obligations.
The protections afforded by the Vienna Convention go far beyond
Breard's case. United States citizens are scattered about the world
as missionaries, Peace Corps volunteers, doctors, teachers and

students, as travelers for business and for pleasure. Their freedom
and safety are seriously endangered if state officials fail to honor the
Vienna Convention and other nations follow their example. Public
officials should bear in mind that 'international law is founded
upon mutually and reciprocity...."

126

For these reasons, Judge Butzner concluded that the Vienna
Convention "should be honored by all nations that have signed
12 7
the treaty and all states of this nation."

V.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION

Foreign governments have also sought to protect their rights
under the Vienna Convention and other consular agreements.
Both Paraguay and Mexico have filed separate lawsuits against

state officials because of their failure to comply with the right of
consular access.
A. Republic of Paraguayv. Allen
On September 12, 1996, the Republic of Paraguay, the
Paraguayan Ambassador to the United States, and the Consul
General of Paraguay filed an action against Virginia officials in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.12 8 The
lawsuit was brought to seek redress for violations of the Vienna
Convention as well as the Treaty of Friendship, stemming from

125.
Id. at 622.
126.
Id. (citations omitted).
127.
Id.
128.
Complaint, Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1271
(E.D. Va. 1996) (No. 3, 96-CV-745).
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Breard's arrest and detention. 129
Specifically, the plaintiffs
argued that Virginia officials failed to notify Breard of his right to
consular access under the Vienna Convention and that they failed
to notify consular officials of Breard's arrest and detention as
required by the Treaty of Friendship. 130 In addition, the Consul
General argued that the defendants' inaction gave rise to a claim
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The plaintiffs requested several
forms of declaratory and injunctive relief.
Specifically, they
requested that the district court: (1) declare that the defendants
violated the Vienna Convention and the Treaty of Friendship; (2)
declare that defendants continued to violate both treaties; (3)
enjoin the defendants from taling any action based on Breard's
conviction and declare any further action based on the conviction
a violation of the treaties; (4) declare Breard's conviction void; and
(5) grant an injunction vacating Breard's conviction and directing
the defendants to abide by the treaties during any future
proceedings against Breard. 3 1
The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.1 3 2 On November 27, 1996,
the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 133 The court divided its analysis into two sections:
(1) subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) justiciability.
With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, the court focused
on Eleventh Amendment immunity and district court review of
state court proceedings.
The district court noted that the
Eleventh Amendment places constitutional limits on federal court
jurisdiction: "In particular, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits
by a foreign government against a state government in federal
court."13 4 The court also noted that the Eleventh Amendment
bars suits against state officials that are really suits against the
state. It recognized, however, the narrow exception set forth in Ex
Parte Young. Under Ex Parte Young, a party at risk of suffering or
presently suffering from a violation of federally protected rights
may seek to enjoin the offending state officers.' 3 5 In order to

129.

Id at 2. Accordingly, jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Under federal question jurisdiction, the district courts have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
130. Compl., Allen, at 2.
131. Id. at 19-2 1.
132.
Motion to Dismiss, Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1272 (E.D. Va. 1996) (Civil
Action No. 3, 96-CV-745).
133.
Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1271.
134.
Id. at 1272 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 17 U.S. 44
(1996); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)).
135.
ExParte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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grant an Ex Parte Young injunction, the court must determine
that there is a continuing violation of federal law and that the
requested relief is prospective. Applying these criteria, the district
court concluded that Paraguay was not the victim of a continuing
violation of federal law: "Although this Court is disenchanted by
Virginia's failure to embrace and abide by the principles embodied
in the Vienna Convention and Friendship Treaty, the Eleventh
13 6
Amendment operates to bar retroactive relief."

The district court also examined the ability of federal district

courts to review state court decisions. 137 It noted that federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction: 'With the exception of
federal habeas review, district courts do not have jurisdiction to
review final decisions of a state court." 3 8 The court indicated
that the power to review a state court ruling rests solely with the
U.S. Supreme Court.
As a separate matter, the district court examined the issue of
justiciability. First, the district court examined whether Paraguay
had standing under the treaties.
Specifically, it focused on
whether Paraguay had suffered an injury and whether the injury
was redressable by the court. The court recognized that Paraguay
was a party to the treaties and although Paraguay's actions would
benefit Breard, Paraguay was the real party in interest. The court
also noted that treaties need not set forth all applicable remedies
for potential violations, and that courts have the power to
interpret treaties and fashion equitable remedies.
For these
reasons, the district court concluded that Paraguay had standing
to seek redress for any violations. Second, the district court
examined the separate claim brought by the Consul General of
Paraguay under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The defendants argued
that Section 1983 only applied to persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States. While the Consul General was a person, the
defendants argued he was not an intended beneficiary of the
treaty obligations. The district court ruled, however, that a
consular official is considered a person subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States. Thus, the court determined that the Consul
General was a proper plaintiff within the meaning of the statute.
Third, the district court examined whether declaratory relief was
an appropriate remedy.
While the defendants had granted

Paraguayan officials unfettered access to Breard since April 1996,
this action did not render the case moot. The court found the
defendants had failed to show that they would not repeat the

136. Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1273 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265
(1986); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977)).
137. Id. (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)).
138. Id.
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illegal conduct. Accordingly, the district court ruled that absent
the jurisdictional limitations, the case would have been suitable
for declaratory relief.
For these reasons, the court concluded that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. It therefore granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Paraguay argued that the
Eleventh Amendment should not bar its claims for relief. 139 First,
Paraguay argued that Virginia officials had not cured their treaty
violations. Even if the violation of Paraguay's rights had ceased,
Ex Parte Young still authorized suits against state officials for
injunctive relief to remedy the continuing effects of past violations
of federal law. These suits were valid as long as they did not seek
retroactive relief. Paraguay was seeking only injunctive relief.
For these reasons, Paraguay's suit fell within the parameters of Ex
Parte Young. Second, Paraguay argued that it was not seeking
the review of a final state court judgment. Since Paraguay had
not been a party to the state proceedings, it had received no
opportunity to litigate its claims at the state level or appeal from
the state court decisions.
Under no rationale can the state court judgment preclude
Paraguay's claim here. The essence of Paraguay's claim is that it
was deprived of its federally protected right to assist its citizen
because it was never informed of the existence of the proceedings
against him. By suggesting that the very proceeding from which
Paraguay was unlawfully excluded could preclude Paraguay from
asserting its right to assist in such proceedings, the District Court

engaged in circular reasoning that finds no support in the authority
on which it relied. The state court judgment is the event which

gives rise to Paraguay's claim. It cannot at the same time pose a bar
to that claim.

140

Interestingly, the United States filed an amicus brief
supporting the district court's judgment of dismissal.141
However, the United States argued that the judgment should be
affirmed without reaching the Eleventh Amendment issues
addressed by the district court. 14 2 Rather, the political question
doctrine barred adjudication and, therefore, the dispute was not
justiciable in domestic courts. The United States argued that

139. Brief for Appellant, Paraguay v. Allen, (4th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-2770).
140. Id at 26.
141. Brief for Amicus Curiae United States, Paraguay v. Allen (4th Cir. 1996)
(No. 96-2770).
142. Id While the United States did not take a position on the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment, its brief suggests that the issue of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in this area is not fully settled. Id. at 31. With respect to
the Ex Porte Young issue, the United States indicated that Paraguay had raised
questions about the district court's holding. Id. at 32.
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disputes between nations over the meaning or application of a
treaty are not cognizable in domestic courts:
[I]t makes no sense under our constitutional scheme of separated

powers for a foreign state to look to our Article III judiciary to tell
the Executive and Legislative Branches that they have violated a
treaty right owed to that foreign state, how such a violation should
be remedied, and how those branches should be dealing with
14 3
foreign governments.

The United States added, however:
We are not contending that foreign states can never sue in federal
courts, or that the courts are prohibited from interpreting and
enforcing treaty rights on behalf of private individuals in certain
circumstances. Rather, we are arguing solely that the courts lack
the power to rule on a suit brought by a foreign nation to enforce
asserted treaty rights on its own behalf in order to overturn
otherwise valid criminal justice proceedings. 4 4

On January 22, 1998, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's ruling. 145 The court focused exclusively on the Eleventh
Amendment because it found it dispositive. 146 While the court
recognized the Ex Parte Young exception to the Eleventh
Amendment, it simply found no ongoing violation of a federally
protected right. Breard's incarceration could not be considered a
presently experienced harmful consequence of past conduct.
Moreover, "Paraguay's claim was not, as it could not be, that
Commonwealth officials were continuing to prevent Paraguay,
either by action or non-action, from providing aid and counseling

to Breard at the time Paraguay filed its action." 14 7 In addition,
the court found that Paraguay's request for relief was in no true
sense prospective.
"Paraguay bases its prospective-relief
contention on the fact that the relief sought is formally couched in
injunctive, declarative terms and on the basis, as if it were
dispositive of the question, that no monetary damages are sought.
But when the essence is considered, the only presently effective
relief sought for the violations claimed and conceded its
essentially retrospective: the voiding of a final state conviction
and sentence." 148 While the court expressed disenchantment
with Virginia's failure to comply with the Vienna Convention, it
held that the Eleventh Amendment precluded relief for any
violations.

143.

Id at 12.

144. 1&at 9.
145. Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
146. Accordingly, it did not address the political question doctrine or the
Roocker-Feldman doctrine regarding appeals of final state court judgments.
147. Id. at 628.
148. Id.
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B. United Mexican States v. Woods
On May 15, 1997, the Mexican government filed a lawsuit
against Arizona officials, challenging the pending execution of
Ramon Martinez-Villareal, a Mexican national. 149 The complaint
alleged that the defendants had violated the rights of the Mexican
government under the Vienna Convention and the Consular
Convention between Mexico and the United States. It also alleged
that the planned execution of Martinez-Villareal would violate the
and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights i5s
customary international law:
In violation of treaty obligations and customary international law,
binding on defendants as the law of the United States and owed
directly to the United Mexican States and its consular officers, the
defendants (1) failed to inform Mexican citizen, Ramon Martinez
Villareal, during and after his arrest of his right to seek the
assistance of Mexican consular officers, as required by article

36(l)(b) of the Vienna Convention, (2) failed to notify Mexican

consular officers directly that a Mexican citizen had been arrested,
as required by articles I and VI of the Bilateral Consular
Convention, (3) failed to provide plaintiffs a meaningftl opportunity
to provide consular assistance to Mr. Martinez Villareal during the

proceedings against him, as required by those two treaties, (4) failed
to ensure that Mr. Martinez Villareal was represented by competent
counsel at all stages of the proceedings; and (5) imposed and intend
to carry out a sentence of death despite the fact that Mr. Martinez
15 1
Villareal is mentally retarded.

In addition, Luis Cabrera, the Consul General of Mexico in the
State of Arizona, sought equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983. The plaintiffs requested that the district court issue a
temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants from
executing Martinez-Villareal.
On May 19, 1997, the federal district court dismissed the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 5 2 The district
court determined that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling.' 5 3
The court found that the Eleventh Amendment
provides immunity to states from lawsuits by foreign governments
in federal court. Moreover, the Ex Parte Young exception was

149.
Complaint, United Mexican States v. Woods, (D.C. Ariz. 1997) (No. CV
97-1075-PHX SMM) (unpublished disposition).
150. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signatureDec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
151.
Compl., Woods, at 2.
152.
Order, Woods (No. CV 97-1075-PHX-SMM).

153.

United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997).

288

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:257

inapplicable because there was no ongoing violation of a federal
right. According to the court:
A criminal proceeding can be roughly analogized to a series of
videotaped scenes: the arrest, the interrogation, the trial, the
sentencing, and the appeal. Each of these scenes is examined post
hoc in state postconviction proceedings and federal habeas. In no
event, however, can the conviction or sentence be considered as a
54
dynamic event, to be examined in a prospective fashion

In the absence of a continuing violation of law, the court
determined that prospective relief was unavailable.

VI. RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND REMEDIES: FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS,
TREATY OBLIGATIONS, AND U.S. COURTS

These cases are unique for several reasons. While foreign
governments have been granted access to U.S. courts in the past,
these cases are, perhaps, the first in which foreign governments

have sought to enforce treaty obligations in federal courts. They
certainly represent the first time that foreign governments have
petitioned U.S. courts to redress violations of the Vienna
Convention.
This Part examines three issues raised by these cases: (1)
when is the United States required to comply with treaty
obligations; (2) whether a foreign government can seek redress in
U.S. courts for treaty violations; and (3) what remedies are
available in U.S. courts for treaty violations.
Throughout this analysis, it is essential to distinguish
between the international and domestic obligations that flow from
international agreements.155
International agreements create
international rights and obligations. These rights and obligations
are between the United States and other countries, and they
cannot be set aside by domestic law. International agreements
can also create domestic rights and obligations. The nature and
scope of these rights and obligations depends upon the status of
the treaty in the United States.
A. When is the United States Required to Comply
with Treaty Obligations?
It is well settled that international agreements are the law of
the United States and supreme over the laws of the several states.

154. Id. at 1223.
155. See generally John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992); Louis Henkin,
InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984).
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Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, "all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." 156 The well-respected Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States reiterates this
fundamental principle, adding that the Executive Branch has an
obligation and the necessary authority to ensure that
international agreements are faithfully executed. 157
This straightforward summary of the Supremacy Clause does
not end the analysis. The United States recognizes the doctrine of
lex posterior derogat priori-the last-in-time doctrine. 158 Under
this doctrine, a treaty may be superseded by a subsequent act of
Congress. Similarly, an act of Congress may be superseded by a
subsequent treaty. One of the first pronouncements of this
doctrine was set forth by the Supreme Court in The Head Money
59
Several shipping companies challenged a federal
Cases.1
statute that imposed a fee on each foreign passenger entering the
United States. 16 0 The companies argued that the passenger fee
was inconsistent with prior U.S. treaty obligations. 16 1 The Court
indicated that a treaty is the "law of the land as an act of
the
Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which
162 It
rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined."
added, however, that subsequent federal legislation displaces 16any
3
conflicting treaty provisions for purposes of domestic law:
"W]e are of the opinion that, so far as a treaty made by the

156.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

157.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 111

cmt. c (1987) [hereinafter

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW].
158. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship
Between CongressionalPower and InternationalLaw: Exceptions to the Last in
Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393 (1988); Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 878 (1987); Henkin, supra

note 155, at 1565.
159.

The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).

160. Id. at 586. The fee was set at 50 cents per passenger. Id.
161. Counsel for the plaintiffs cited treaties with Belgium, Denmark, France,
Great Britain, Netherlands, Norway, Prussia, and Sweden. Id. at 585.
162. Id. at 598-99.
163. The Court noted that this question had presumably been resolved in
The Cherokee Tobacco case. Id. at 597. In Cherokee Tobacco, the Court stated:
The effect of treaties and acts of Congress, when in conflict, is not
settled by the Constitution. But the question is not involved in any
doubt as to its proper solution. A treaty may supersede a prior act
of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.
The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1801).
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United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of
judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to
such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification,
16 4
or repeal."
The Supreme Court reiterated this doctrine in Whitney v.
Robertson.165 In Whitney, several merchants challenged the
imposition of customs duties on sugar products, arguing that
they were contrary to the provisions of a treaty between the
United States and the Dominican Republic.166 In its opinion, the
Court examined the relationship between treaties and federal
legislation:
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and
made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared
by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no

superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two
relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to
construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done
without violating the language of either; but if the two are
inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other... 167

Because the "duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to
the latest expression of the sovereign will," the Court ruled that
the treaty had been superseded by the subsequent federal
68
statute. 1
Similarly, in Diggs v. Shultz, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia examined the 1972 Byrd Amendment which
authorized the importation of chromite from Southern Rhodesia
in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 232.169
Resolution 232 was adopted by the Security Council in 1966 and
imposed a trade embargo on Southern Rhodesia. 170 In 1971,
Congress adopted the Byrd Amendment, which allowed the
resumption of trade with Southern Rhodesia.' 7 1 The court noted
that the purpose of the Byrd Amendment was "to detach this
country from the U.N. boycott of Southern Rhodesia in blatant
disregard of our treaty undertakings." 172 Despite this, the court
held that "under our constitutional scheme, Congress can

164.
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 599.
165.
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887). See also The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 247 (1889).
166.
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 191.
167.
Id. at 194.

168.

1d.at 195.

169.

Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,

411 U.S. 931 (1973). See also Committee of United States Citizens in Nicar. v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
170. Diggs,470 F.2d at 463.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 466.
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denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so, and there is nothing the
other branches of government can do about it." 17 3
The United States also recognizes the doctrine of selfexecuting treaties, which further limits the application of treaty
provisions in the United States.174 Under the principles first
enunciated in Fosterv. Neilson, unless a treaty provision indicates
that it does not require further congressional action, or unless
Congress enacts legislation implementing the treaty provision, the
treaty is viewed as an interstate contract, unenforceable in U.S.
In Foster, a dispute arose between landowners in
courts. 175
Louisiana concerning title to property. 17 6 The property had been
the subject of an 1819 treaty signed between the United States
and Spain, which transferred title to a large tract of land,
including the disputed property, to the United States. 177 The
Supreme Court began by examining the status of treaties in the
United States. The Court noted that the U.S. Constitution
declares a treaty to be the law of the land: "It is, consequently, to
be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision."' 7 8 When a treaty indicates the need for
legislative action to perform any obligations, however, "the treaty
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the Court." 17 9 Examining the relevant articles of the
1819 treaty, the Court concluded that they were not selflegislative action before
executing and, therefore, they required
18 0
they could be applied by the courts.
In Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals examined a Trusteeship Agreement in which the
United Nations designated the United States as the administering

173. Id.
See generally Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self174.
Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995); Jordan J. Paust, SelfExecuting Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of
Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A CriticalAnalysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L
L. 627 (1986).
175. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1824).
176. Id. at 299-300.

177. Id. at 310. The main issue in the case was whether the United States
acquired right to the disputed property under an 1803 treaty with France or under
the 1819 treaty with Spain. Id.
178. Id. at 314.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 315-17. In United States v. Percheman, the Court reviewed the
same treaty provisions although in this case it examined the Spanish language text
of the treaty provisions. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87-89 (1833). Based upon this review,

the Court reversed its earlier holding in Foster and concluded that the treaty was,
in fact, self-executing. Id. at 89.
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authority of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 18 1 Citizens
of the Trust Territory had sued in federal district court, arguing
that a proposed agreement between the High Commissioner of the
Trust Territory and Continental Airlines violated the Trusteeship
Agreement. i s 2
The Court of Appeals examined whether the
agreement was self-executing and could be enforced by individual
litigants in federal court. According to the court:
The extent to which an international agreement establishes
affirmative and judicially enforceable
obligations without
implementing legislation must be determined in each case by
reference to many contextual factors: the purposes of the treaty
and the objectives of its creators, the existence of domestic
procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation,
the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods,
and the immediate and long-range social consequences of self- or
1 3
non-self-execution.

Applying these criteria, the court concluded that the Trusteeship
was self-executing because it established direct, affirmative, and
judicially enforceable rights. 18 4 In contrast, other courts have
held that provisions of other international agreements, such as
the U.N. Charter, the Helsinld Accords, and the OAS Charter, are
not self-executing and, therefore, do not provide judicially
8 5
enforceable rights to private litigants.'
Thus, the status of international agreements in the United
States turns in part upon whether they were intended to be selfexecuting. Absent implementing legislation, it is only when a
treaty provision is self-executing, when it prescribes rules by
which rights may be determined ex proprio vigore, that it may be
86
relied upon for the enforcement of such rights.1
While these doctrines may limit the application of treaties in
the United States, they do not obviate U.S. obligations under
international law. The United States remains responsible to other
countries for complying with its international obligations. As
noted in the Restatement (Third), "[t]hat a rule of international
law or a provision of an international agreement is superseded as
domestic law does not relieve the United States of its international

181. Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 95 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
182. Id. at 96.
183. Id. at 97.
184. Id. at 97-98. The court, however, also held that under the principle of
conity these rights should be asserted frst before the High Court of the Trust
Territory. Id. at 99.
185. See Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832
(1979); Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 722 (1952).
186. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 835 (1976).
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obligation or of the consequences of a violation of that
obligation." 187

This principle of international responsibility is

codified in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties which provides that "[a] party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty."' 8 8

More broadly, international law provides

that a state is obligated to comply with a treaty that has been
ratified and has entered into force. This obligation is codified in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
provides that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith."1 8 9 Indeed, this
principle represents one of the most important obligations in
international law: pacta sunt servanda-treaties must be
It is considered to be a jus cogens norm, a
observed. 190
fundamental standard of conduct that cannot be set aside by
treaty or acquiescence.
In sum, international agreements create both international
and domestic obligations for the United States. This distinction is
fundamental in determining the consequences of treaty violations
19 1
in the United States.

187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115.
188. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signatureMay 23,
1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). See also
Trealnent of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin in the Danzig
Territory, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, at 24 (Feb. 4, 1932).
189. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supranote 188, art. 26.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 321 cmt. a.
190.
191. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in one of the earliest
cases addressing the application of international obligations in the United States.

United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 103 (1801). The Court
examined the validity of the proposed condemnation and sale of the Peggy.
Specifically, the Court examined whether the condemnation was in violation of a
treaty between the United States and France. According to the Court:
The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the supreme
law of the land. Of consequence its obligation on the courts of the United
States must be admitted. It is certainly true that the execution of a
contract between nations is to be demanded from, and, in the general,
superintended by the executive of each nation, and therefore, whatever the
decision of this court may be relative to the rights of parties litigating before
it, the claim upon the nation if unsatisfied, may still be asserted. But yet
where a treaty is the law of the land, and as such affects the rights of
parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds those rights and is as
much to be regarded by the court as an act of congress; and although
restoration may be an executive, when viewed as a substantive, act
independent of, and unconnected with, other circumstances, yet to
condemn a vessel, the restoration of which is directed by a law of the land,
would be a direct infraction of that law, and of consequence, improper.
Id. at 109-10.
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Treaty obligations are not limited to the federal government;

they also apply to state and local governments. 192

The

Constitution recognizes the primacy of treaty obligations, and this
principle has been affirmed in numerous Supreme Court
rulings.

193

In The Federalist No. 42, James Madison emphasized the
importance of federal supremacy over state and local
19 4
governments, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs.
Madison argued that the power to make treaties and regulate
commerce with foreign nations "forms an obvious and essential
branch of the federal administration. If we are to be one nation in
195
any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."
Indeed, one of the limitations of the Articles of Confederation was
its inability to effectively regulate foreign commerce by the

192.

See generally Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and

International Cases, 20 YALE J. INTL L. 1 (1995); Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State
Authority, and the Preemptive Power of InternationalLaw, Sup. CT. REV., 1994 at
295, 296; Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 1441 (1994); Note, Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the
Federaland State Governments, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1269 (1991); Harold G. Maier,
Preemptionof State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1989);
Paul L. Hoffman, The Application of InternationalHuman Rights Law in State Courts:
A View from California, 18 INT'L LAw. 61 (1984); Kathryn Burke et al., Application of
InternationalHuman Rights Law in State and FederalCourts, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 291
(1983).
193.
It is important to distinguish between treaties, customary international
law, and other forms of international behavior. State and local governments are
bound by U.S. treaties. They are also bound by customary international law that
is recognized by the United States. They are not bound, however, by other forms of
international behavior. For example, states are not bound by the intrastate
practice of foreign governments. Intrastate behavior includes the domestic practice
of foreign governments. Thus, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), the
Court addressed whether executing a minor who was sixteen when he committed
his crime was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 365. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia rejected the use of international standards as binding norms on
state courts:

We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are

dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various
amici... that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant.
While "[t]he practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can
be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is
not merely a historical accident, but rather so 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text
permitting, in our Constitution as well".., they cannot serve to establish
the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted
among our people.
Id. at 369 n.1 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
194. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
195.
Id.
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individual states. This notion of federal supremacy was echoed by

John Jay in The FederalistNo. 3:
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the
laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears
evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one
national government than it could be either by thirteen separate
96
States or by three or four distinct confederacies.

This view of federal supremacy was placed in the text of the
Constitution, where the Supremacy Clause recognizes that
treaties are the supreme law of the land.
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has affirmed the
primacy of treaty obligations over state law.1 9 7 In Ware v. Hylton,
the Court examined the relationship between a treaty and state
law. 19 8 The 1783 Treaty of Peace between the United States and
Great Britain provided that British creditors could recover debts
The Court
previously owed to them by American citizens.
determined that the Treaty of Peace took precedence over
inconsistent state law. According to Justice Chase, "[t]he treaty
of 1783 has superior power to the Legislature of any State,
because no Legislature of any State has any kind of power over
the Constitution, which was its creator." 19 9 Justice Chase added
that it was the responsibility of the judiciary to uphold the treaty
over inconsistent state law.
In the seminal case of Missouri v. Holland, the Court

examined the validity of a treaty and subsequent implementing
legislation against charges by Missouri that these acts were "an
unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the
States by the Tenth Amendment," and that they threatened to
"invade the sovereign right of the State and contravene its will
manifested in statutes."2 0°
A 1916 treaty between the United
States and Great Britain sought to protect migratory birds moving
between the United States and Canada. Congress subsequently
enacted legislation implementing the treaty, and the Secretary of
Agriculture soon promulgated regulations pursuant to this
legislation.2 0 1
In a typically terse holding, Justice Holmes
determined that the treaty and legislation were valid exercises of
federal power. The opinion emphasized the important role played

196. THE FEDERALISTNO. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
197. In United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), the Supreme Court
noted: "Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised
without regard to state laws or policies. In respect of all international negotiations
and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear." Id. at 331. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 231 (1942).
198. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 204 (1796).
199. Id. at 237.
200. Missouriv. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,431 (1920).
201. Id.at431-32.
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by the federal government in regulating matters of national
concern:
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is
involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with
that of another power. The subject matter is only transitorily within
the State and has no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty
and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal
with.
We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the
Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the
protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not
sufficient to rely upon the States?02

Indeed, the primacy of treaty obligations provides one
possible basis for challenging state immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment.2 0 3 It can be argued that a duly ratified
treaty, adopted pursuant to the foreign affairs power, implicitly
authorizes a foreign government to sue a state in order to enforce
treaty provisions. 2 ° 4 The Supreme Court has recognized the
ability of Congress to abrogate state immunity. For example, the
Court indicated in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to abrogate state
20 5
immunity from suit in federal court.
While the Supreme Court held in Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi that the Eleventh Amendment provides states with
immunity from lawsuits filed by foreign governments in federal
courts, it did not fully address whether such immunity extends to

lawsuits involving self-executing treaty obligations. 2° 6 Unlike
controversies that may involve purely international questions,

self-executing treaty obligations have become the law of the land
through their approval by the Senate and their ratification by the
President.

The notion of federal dominance over state and local
governments in the realm of foreign affairs is also consistent with
international law. International law recognizes the liability of the
central government for violations committed by any entity
empowered to exercise governmental authority. 20 7

Thus, the

202. AL at 435.
203. It can also be argued that states had no sovereign immunity to cede in
the area of foreign affairs. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936).
204.
The First Circuit has held that Congress has the power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it acts pursuant to its War Powers.
Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 (1st Cir. 1996); Reopell
v. Massachusetts, 936 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1991).
205.
427 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
206.
292 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1934).
207.
According to McNair,
[A] State has a right to delegate to its judicial department the application
and interpretation of treaties. If, however, the courts commit errors in that
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Restatement (Third) provides that "[a] state is responsible for
carrying out the obligations of an international agreement. A
federal state may leave implementation to its constituent units,
20 8
but the state remains responsible for failure of compliance."
According to Sir Ian Brownile, the law in this respect is wellsettled:
A state cannot plead provisions of its own law or deficiencies in that
law in answer to a claim against it for an alleged breach of its
obligations under international law. The acts of the legislature and
other sources of internal rules and decision-making are not to be
regarded as acts of some third party for which the state is not
responsible, and any other principle would facilitate evasion of
obligations. 20 9

B. Can a Foreign Government Seek Redress
for Treaty Violations in U.S. Courts?
If the United States is required to comply with treaty
obligations, it follows that the federal courts should have the
with these agreements and provide
authority to review compliance
2 10
redress for violations thereof.
This judicial power is explicitly set forth in the

Constitution. 2 1 ' Article III of the Constitution provides that the
federal judicial power extends to "all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under . . . Treaties" of the United States; "to all Cases

task or decline to give effect to the treaty or are unable to do so because the
necessary change in, or addition to, the national law has not been made,
their judgments involve the State in a breach of treaty.
ARNOLD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 346 (196 1).
For a recent example of federal liability for the actions of the individual states
in the realm of international trade, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Panel Report-United States Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages,
June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 2-6 (1993).
208.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 321 cmt. b.

209. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (4th ed.
1990).
210. As noted in Marbury v. Madison, one of the most significant
functions of the judiciary is to "say what the law is." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803).
211. The power of the judiciary to review and uphold international
obligations was recognized during the ratification of the Constitution. As noted by
one delegate, the judicial power over treaties "will show the world that we make the
faith of treaties a constitutional part of the character of the United States; that we
secure its performance no longer nominally, for the judges of the United States will
be enabled to carry it into effect. . ." 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 490 (Jonathan Elliot

ed., 2d ed. 1987). Similarly, Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist Papers
that "[t]he treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered
as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals,
must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations." TiHE
FEDERALIST No. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls;" and
to "Controversies... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States."2 12 Article VI recognizes that treaties are "the
supreme Law of the Land, and that "the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby . .. "13 Several statutory provisions
further recognize the role of the judiciary in reviewing
international agreements. For example, 28 U.S.C. Section 1331
provides that the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States."2 14 Similarly, 28 U.S.C. Section 1350 provides
that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action brought by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."2 15 The
habeas corpus statutes, such as 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(a),
provide that the federal courts "shall entertain an application for
a writ of habeas corpus in [sic] behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that
he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States."2 16 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Supreme Court has noted that "[tihe construction of treaties is
2 17
the peculiar province of the judiciary."
While the federal courts have the authority to review U.S.
treaty obligations, a more interesting question is whether a

foreign government can seek redress for treaty violations in
federal courts. It does not appear that federal courts have
addressed this question. While foreign citizens and consular
officials have sought to enforce treaty obligations in U.S. courts, it
is somewhat unclear whether foreign governments have a
2 18
comparable right of access.
As a first step, courts have long recognized the right of access
by foreign governments to U.S. courts. 21 9 In Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino,22 0 the Supreme Court examined whether an
entity of the Cuban government could bring an action against a
private party in U.S. courts. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan

212.
U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1.
213.
Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
215.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). See generally Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461
(1989); Kenneth Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73
MINN. L. REv. 349 (1988).
216.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994).

217.

Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899).

218

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 907(1).

219. According to the Restatement (Third), "foreign governments and officials
are generally reluctant to resort to national courts of other states to vindicate
rights under international law." Id. § 111, n.4.
220.
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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noted that, "[u]nder principles of comity governing this country's
relations with other nations, sovereign states are allowed to sue in
the courts of the United States."2 2 1 Thus, the Supreme Court
granted access to the Cuban government despite the fact that
diplomatic relations had been severed, a commercial embargo
existed between the two countries, and Cuban assets had been
frozen in the United States. The Court noted that the right of
access to U.S. courts applied regardless of reciprocity of treatment
by Cuban courts. The Court held that "we are constrained to
consider any relationship, short of war, with a recognized
sovereign power as embracing the privilege of resorting to United
2 22
States courts."
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't
of India, a case involving the right to sue in federal court under
federal statutory provisions. 223 The Indian government, along
with the governments of Iran and the Philippines, brought suit in
federal
court
seeking treble
damages
against
several
pharmaceutical companies for alleged violations of U.S. antitrust
laws. The pharmaceutical companies argued that foreign nations
were not "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages under the
Clayton Act.2 24 The Court first noted that the term 'person" as
used in the Clayton Act was quite broad and, therefore, it did not
exclude foreign governments from its ambit. The Court then
stated that foreign governments are generally entitled to
prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the United States on the
same basis as a domestic corporation or an individual. 2 2s "To
deny [a foreign sovereign] this privilege would manifest a want of
comity and friendly feeling."2 2 6 Thus, it held that
a foreign nation otherwise entitled to sue in our courts is entitled to
sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws to the same extent
as any other plaintiff. Neither the fact that the respondents are
foreign nor the fact that they are sovereign is reason to deny them
the remedy of treble damages Congress afforded to 'any person'
27
victimized by violations of the antitrust laws.

The Court noted that this result was merely the specific
application of a long-settled rule. Finally, the Court added that

221. Id. at 408-09.
222. Id. at 410.
223. Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 309 (1978).
224. Id. at 311.
225. IH at 318-19. See also Swiss Confederation v. United States, 70 F.
Supp. 235, 236-37 (Ct. Cl. 1947); Principalityof Monaco, 292 U.S. at 331; Russian
Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 492 (1931); Colombia v. Cauca Co.,
190 U.S. 524, 525 (1903).
226.
Pfizer Inc., 434 U.S. at 319 (quoting The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wallace)

164, 167 (1870)).
227.

PJfzerInc., 434 U.S. at 320.
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this result "does not require the Judiciary in any way to interfere
2 28
in sensitive matters of foreign policy."
Along with foreign governments, official representatives of
foreign governments have been granted access to U.S. courts. For
example, the courts have recognized the right of foreign consuls to
challenge treaty violations in U.S. courts. 2 2 9 In Wildenhus's

Case, the Supreme Court examined a claim brought by a Belgian
consul pursuant to a treaty between the United States and
Belgium. 23 0 The 1880 Convention between the United States and
Belgium conferred authority upon Belgian consuls in the United
States to maintain order upon Belgian crews and merchant
vessels in U.S. ports. In this case, a Belgian national allegedly
murdered a fellow crewman on board a Belgian steamship docked
in Jersey City. He was subsequently arrested and charged with
the murder by state officials. The Belgian consul argued that he
had sole authority to examine the case under the 1880
Convention and, therefore, the State of New Jersey was without
jurisdiction to prosecute the Belgian national. To pursue this
claim, the Belgian consul filed a habeas corpus petition in federal
court. The district court denied the petition. The Court indicated
that the treaty governed the conduct of the United States and
Belgium in this area: "If it gives the consul of Belgium exclusive
jurisdiction over the offence which it is alleged has been
committed within the territory of New Jersey, we see no reason
why he may not enforce his rights under the treaty by writ of
habeas corpus in any proper court of the United States."2 3 1 After
reviewing the scope of the treaty, however, the Court determined
that it did not apply to the case.

228. Id at 319. The Court added that its holding did not qualify the
established rule that the Executive Branch maintains the exclusive power to

recognize foreign governments and, therefore, to determine which nations are
entitled to access to U.S. courts. In addition, the Court cited a letter submitted by
the Department of State to the Court of Appeals indicating that it did not anticipate
any foreign policy problems arising if foreign governments were held to be persons
within the meaning of the Clayton Act. Id. at 320.
229. See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40-41 (1931) (consul
general of Italy filing suit on behalf of Italy under 1878 Consular Convention);
Kolovrat v. Oregon 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Dallemagne v. Moisan, 197 U.S. 169,
177-78 (1905); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 429 (1902); In re Thomas
Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 Howard) 103, 108 (1852); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66,

67 (1825); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 284 (1822); The
Arrogante Barcelones, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 496, 496 (1822); Glass v. The Sloop
Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794).

230. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 17 (1886). The docket title of the case
was: Charles Mali, Consul of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, and Joseph
Wildenhus, Gionviennie Gobnbosich, and John J. Ostenmeyer v. The Keeper of the

Common Jail of Hudson County, New Jersey.
231. I& at 17.
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On several occasions, state courts have recognized the right
foreign governments to litigate alleged violations of

international law.

In Argentina v. New York, the Republic of

Argentina instituted an action against the city of New York
seeking the return of property taxes collected on the property
where the Argentine consulate was located.2 32 Argentina argued
that the property was exempt from such payments under
customary international law. The New York court first recognized
that the city was bound to comply with international law. After
reviewing customary international law, the court concluded that
consular property was immune from local property taxes.
In Finland v. Pelham, the Finnish government also challenged
the imposition of municipal taxes on consular property, although
this case involved a treaty obligation. 2 33 Specifically, the 1934
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the
United States and Finland provided that consular property was
exempt from taxation of every kind.23 4 The Finnish government
argued that the treaty precluded the city of Pelham from taxing
consular property.2 3 5 Referring to the Supreme Court's warning
in Sabbatino that rules of international law should not be left to
divergent and parochial state interpretations, the New York court
found that the treaty obligation took precedence over inconsistent
2 36
municipal regulations.
In addition to judicial recognition of this right, the past
actions of the Executive Branch support the notion that foreign
governments can litigate violations of international law in U.S.
courts. 23 7 For example, the United States filed an amicus brief in
23 8
support of Argentina's action in Argentina v. City of New York.
In its amicus brief, the United States acknowledged the
importance of state compliance with international obligations.
This principle compelled the United States to file the brief in
support of Argentina.2 3 9 In Finland v. Pelham, the United States
intervened in the case to support the Finnish government.240
United States government policy to intervene in such cases was

232. Argentina v. New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252, 257 (N.Y. 1969).
233. Finland v. Pelham, 270 N.Y.S.2d 661, 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
234. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, Feb. 13,
1934, U.S.-Fin., 49 Stat. 2659.
235. Pelham, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
236. Id at 664.
237. The Executive Branch has also used foreign courts to protect U.S.
treaty rights abroad. See United States Govt v. Bowe, 1990 App. Cas. 500
(Bahamas); United States v. Jennings, 1983 App. Cas. 624 (H. L. 1982).
238. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Argentina v. City of
New York, 250 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1969).
239. Id at 1-2.
240. Pehamn, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
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subsequently revised although it continued to recognize that
foreign governments could litigate their cases in U.S. courts. In
1979, the Attorney General's office prepared a memorandum
examining whether the United States should conduct litigation on
behalf of the People's Republic of China in U.S. courts. 24 1
According to the memorandum, "the Executive Branch has
strongly gone on record before the Congress and in
communications to foreign states that it will no longer represent
the interests of foreign states in domestic courts, but that it will
expect foreign governments to protect their interests directly,
through counsel of their choice." 24 2 The ability of foreign
governments to protect their interests applied to both prosecuting
and defending actions in U.S. courts. 2 43 As the recent amicus
brief filed by the U.S. government in Paraguayv. Allen indicates,
the U.S. government no longer believes that foreign governments
may litigate treaty violations in federal court.
The preceding cases reveal that foreign governments clearly
have a right of access to federal courts. Furthermore, these cases
indicate that foreign governments can litigate alleged treaty
violations in U.S. courts. Despite these findings, an important
issue involves the question of standing-do foreign governments
have standing to seek redress for treaty violations? To establish
standing, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he has suffered an injury;
(2) the defendant caused the injury; and (3) the injury is
redressable by the court. 2 44 While an analysis of each of these
requirements depends upon the particular facts of the case at
hand, some general observations are possible.
Courts have
consistently found that treaties are contracts between
governments. 2 45 They are "designed to protect the sovereign
interests of nations, and it is up to the offended nations to
determine whether a violation of sovereign interests occurred and
requires redress." 2 46 As this contractual analogy suggests, the
241.

See Memorandum for the Attorney General, Jan. 18, 1979, reprinted in

MARIAN LLOYD NASH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (1979).

242. Id. at 156.
243. Id.
244. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation
of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). See also William A. Fletcher,
The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988).
245. See Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 537 (4th Cir. 1996); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984); Charlton v. Kelly,
229 U.S. 447, 474 (1913); Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; The Head Money Cases, 112
U.S. at 598 (supporting the proposition that treaties are contracts between
nations).
246. United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988). For
this reason, some federal courts have precluded individuals from asserting treaty
violations if the relevant foreign government has not filed a protest alleging a treaty
violation. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1990);
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failure to comply with a treaty provision is considered a breach.
the
In turn, a treaty breach is considered an injury, entitling
2 47
injured state to seek redress from the defaulting state.
As to the redressability requirement, not all treaty violations
are redressable in U.S. courts. As indicated, if a treaty provision
is not self-executing (i.e., it does not establish immediate rights
and obligations) and no implementing legislation has been
enacted by Congress, lawsuits seeking redress for treaty
violations are unavailable in U.S. courts. On these occasions,
courts can provide no redress and only nonjudicial remedies are
available. 2 48 The Supreme Court reached this conclusion in The
Head Money Cases where it held that:
[a treaty] depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the
interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If
these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to
seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is
obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and
49
can give no redress.

Similarly, in Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior,Judge Trask

noted in his concurring opinion that, "[ulnless a treaty is selfexecuting, in order to be cognizable before the courts it must be
implemented by legislation.

Otherwise it constitutes a compact

between sovereign and independent nations dependent for its
recognition and enforcement upon the honor and the continuing

United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 28 (1st Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958
(1983); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1090 (5th Cir. 1980); United States ex reL Lujan
v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975). But cf. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265
U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (apparently Japan filed no protest). The Supreme Court's
ruling in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), suggests that such
a requirement is unnecessary. Id. at 667. There, the Court examined the Court of
Appeals' assertion that there must be a formal protest from the offended
government after a kidnapping in order for an individual defendant to assert a
right under an extradition treaty. The Court found this assertion problematic.
"The Extradition Treaty has the force of law, and if, as respondent asserts, it is selfexecuting, it would appear that a court must enforce it on behalf of an individual
regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the other nation."
See Charles D. Siegal, Individual Rights Under Self-Executing Extradition
Id.
Treaties-Dr.Alvarez-Machain's Case, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 765, 798
(1991).
See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 781, 795
247.
(1994). This analysis does not suggest, however, that individuals have no rights
under treaties. Courts are increasingly recognizing the rights and obligations of
non-state actors under international law. See Kadic v. Karadiid, 70 F.3d 232,
239-42 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga,630 F.2d at 884.
See Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092
248.
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1215, 1222-23 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464, 468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598.
249.
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self-interest of the parties to it."250 In contrast, courts are clearly
empowered to adjudicate claims regarding self-executing
treaties. 25 1 Indeed, "[i]n the domestic realm courts are not only
equipped to enforce self-executing treaties affecting individual
rights, but by virtue of the Supremacy Clause are required to do
so."

252

Alternatively, if Congress enacts legislation that is
inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations, actions seeking redress
for violations of these treaty obligations are also unavailable in
U.S. courts. This conclusion follows naturally from the doctrine
of lexposteriorderogatpriori.Thus, in Whitney, the Court stated:
If the country with which the treaty is made is dissatisfied with the
action of the legislative department, it may present its complaint to
the executive head of the government, and take such other
measures as it may deem essential for the protection of its interests,
The courts can afford no redress. Whether the complaining nation
has just cause of complaint, or our country was justified in its
53
legislation, are not matters for judicial cognizance.

It is important to distinguish these standing issues from the
political question doctrine.2 5 4 The political question doctrine was
developed by the courts to recognize that the principle of
separation of powers precludes judicial review of certain issues.
In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan set forth the criteria for

determining whether a particular issue involves a political
question:

2 s5

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; [2] or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; [3] or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; [4]
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of
government; [5] or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; [6] or the potentiality of

250.
Saipan, 502 F.2d at 101 (Trask, J., concurring).
251.
See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-599 (explaining that a
court may rely on a treaty as it would a statute for a rule of decision); see also
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (comparing the effect of a treaty to an act passed by
Congress).
252.
Laird, 459 F.2d at 1222.
253.
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
254. For commentary on the political question doctrine, see generally
Michael J. Glennon, ForeignAffairs and the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 814 (1989); Charles D. Siegal, Deference and Its Dangers: Congress' Power
to ODefine ... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865
(1988); Jonathan I. Charney, JudicialDeference in ForeignRelations, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 805 (1989); Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?,85 YALE L.J.
597 (1976).
255. Baker v. Cart, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See also United States v.
Munoz-Fores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-90 (1990).
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pronouncements by various
embarrassment from multifarious
56
F
departments on one question

With respect to foreign affairs, Justice Brennan recognized that
such matters often involve issues that defy judicial application.
He cautioned, however, that "it is error to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
2 57
cognizance."
Issues that have been deemed political questions include the
status of military hostilities and the recognition of foreign
In recent years, however, courts have been
governments. 25 8
increasingly reluctant to dismiss cases solely on the basis of the
political question doctrine. 25 9 By definition, treaties involve some
element of foreign affairs, and yet courts routinely engage in
treaty interpretation. For example, in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am.
Cetacean Soc'y, the Supreme Court examined whether a case
involving the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling and a subsequent executive agreement between the

United States and Japan was nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine. 260 Writing for the majority, Justice White
dismissed the contention that such matters are beyond the
purview of the judiciary. With respect to treaty interpretation,
Justice White stated, "the courts have the authority to construe
treaties and executive agreements, and it goes without saying that
is a recurring and accepted
interpreting congressional legislation
26
task for the federal courts." '
It is essential, therefore, to distinguish between cases
involving political questions, such as recognition of foreign
governments, which the judiciary cannot address, and cases
involving legal questions, such as treaty interpretation, which the
judiciary is empowered to review. Heeding the words of Justice
Brennan, courts have come to recognize that not every case

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979),
256.
Justice Powell identified three principal questions underlying the doctrine: "(i)
Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the
Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the

question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do
Id. at 998
prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?"
(Powell, J., concurring).
257. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
258. See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982), af'd, 720
F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614-16 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affid sub nom., Atlee
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 515
(D. Mass. 1968).
259. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249-50; Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937
F.2d 44, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1991); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1145-46
(D.D.C. 1990).
260. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Socy, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
261. Id. at 230.
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touching upon foreign relations is nonjusticiable.
Moreover,
simple assertions by the Executive Branch that certain issues are
political questions and, therefore, beyond the scope of judicial
2 62
review, are not viewed as dispositive by the courts.
In sum, while foreign governments may seek redress for
treaty violations in U.S. courts, the viability and success of these
actions depend upon the status of the treaty provision in the
2 63
United States.
C. What Remedies areAvailable for Treaty
Violations in U.S. Courts?
As discussed, courts in the United States have the authority
to review U.S. treaty obligations. They are also empowered to
develop appropriate remedies in the event of a violation. Indeed,
the federal courts maintain inherent equitable powers that are
available for the proper exercise of their jurisdiction. 2 64 For this
reason, the Restatement (Third) indicates that "[clourts in the
United States are bound to give effect to international law and to
2 65
international agreements of the United States."
In responding to a treaty violation, courts should provide a
2 66
remedy that avoids or cures the violation by the United States.

For example, several cases have held that a treaty violation
divests a court of jurisdiction over a criminal defendant when the
defendant is

captured in

violation

of a

treaty.

These cases

recognize that a treaty violation may act to deprive courts of their
jurisdiction over property and individuals that would otherwise be
267
subject to that jurisdiction.

262.
See Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1145.
263.
Secretary of State Webster noted in correspondence to a Spanish
minister that "[w]ith us a treaty is part of the supreme law of the land; as such, it
influences and controls the decisions of all tribunals; and many instances might be
quoted of decisions made in the Supreme Court of the United States, arising under
their several treaties with Spain herself, as well as under treaties between the
United States and other nations."
5 JOHN BAsSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 237 (1906).
264.
See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-89 (1970); Porter
v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). This includes the power to
enjoin the enforcement of a state court judgment rendered in violation of federal
law. See French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250, 252-53 (1874).
265.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(3).
266.
See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of
Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1161 (1992).
267.
See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 605-06 (1927);
United States v. Schouweiler, 19 F.2d 387, 388 (S.D. Cal. 1927); United States v.
Ferris, 19 F.2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1927) (explaining that a treaty which limits a
party's jurisdiction will restrict a court's ability to enforce the treaty).
Similarly, a state court indicated that:
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In United States v. Rauscher, the defendant was extradited
from England to the United States for murder pursuant to the
Ashburton Treaty of 1842, which governed extradition between
the two countries. 2 68 The defendant was subsequently charged
with a different crime before the Circuit Court for the Southern
Rauscher challenged his federal
District of New York.
prosecution, arguing that the doctrine of specialty was a
necessary and implied term of the treaty. 26 9 The doctrine of
specialty provides that a person who has been extradited may not
be tried for an offense other than the one for which he was
extradited. 270 The Supreme Court examined the history and
terms of the treaty, the practice of nations, case law from the
states, and the writings of commentators and concluded that the
doctrine of specialty was an implied term of the treaty. 2 7 1 Thus,
the Court held that "[a] person who has been brought within the
jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an
extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences
described in that treaty, and for the offence with which he is
The Court
charged in the proceedings for his extradition.. .272
suggested that for the United States to act otherwise, in
contravention of the treaty, would be in bad faith: "No such view
of solemn public treaties between the great nations of the earth
can be sustained by a tribunal called upon to give judicial
construction to them."2 73 Thus, the Court held that the Circuit
Court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant.

[wihen it is provided by treaty that certain acts shall not be done, or that
certain limitations or restrictions shall not be disregarded or exceeded by
the contracting parties, the compact does not need to be supplemented by
legislative or executive action, to authorize the courts of justice to decline to
override those limitations or to exceed the prescribed restrictions, for the
palpable and all-sufficient reason, that to do so would be not only to violate
the public faith, but to transgress the "supreme law of the land."

Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702-03 (1878).
268. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
Id.
269.
270.
See generally Kenneth E. Levitt, InternationalExtradition, the Principleof
Specialty, and Effective Treaty Enforcement, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1017 (1992); John G.
Kester, Some Myths of United States ExtraditionLaw, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441 (1988); M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (2d
ed. 1987); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC

ORDER 311-60 (1974).
271.
'That right... is that he shall be tried only for the offence with which
he is charged in the extradition proceedings and for which he was delivered up,
and that if not tried for that, or after trial and acquittal, he shall have a reasonable
time to leave the country before he is arrested upon the charge of any other crime
committed previous to his extradition." Rauscher,119 U.S. at 424.
272.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 422.
273.
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In Cook v. United States, a British vessel was boarded by U.S.
Coast Guard officers approximately twelve miles off the coast of
Massachusetts.

274

After determining that the vessel contained

contraband, the officers seized the vessel and delivered it to U.S.
customs officials. The U.S. government then initiated libel

proceedings in federal court against the vessel and its cargo.
Cook, as master of the vessel, challenged the proceedings, arguing
that the United States had no authority to seize the vessel since it
was beyond the distance recognized by a treaty between the
United States and Great Britain. 2 75
The treaty authorized
American officials to board British ships to determine whether
they were importing alcoholic beverages into the United States. It
provided, however, that the boarding rights could not be exercised
at a greater distance from the coast than the British ship could
travel in one hour. The Supreme Court determined that the
seizure was not authorized by the treaty:
The objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely
because made by one upon whom the Government had not
conferred authority to seize at the place where the seizure was
made. The objection is that the Government itself lacked power to
seize, since by the Treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation

upon its

own authority ....

To hold that adjudication may follow a

wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the

Treaty.

276

Thus, the Court held that U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction over the
27 7
vessel.
Treaty violations can also provide a defense against state
court proceedings.

In Asakura v. City of Seattle, a Japanese

national operating a pawnshop in the city of Seattle was
prosecuted for violating a city ordinance which prohibited foreign
nationals from conducting such business.2 78 Asakura brought an
action against the city, its comptroller, and its chief of police to
restrain them from enforcing the ordinance against him. He
argued that the ordinance violated a treaty signed between the
United States and Japan which provided that the citizens or
subjects of each country had the right to carry on trade in the
other country on the same terms as the citizens of the host
country. The Superior Court of King County ruled in favor of
Asakura. On appeal, however, the Washington Supreme Court
held the ordinance to be valid and reversed the lower court

274. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 107 (1933). See also Felice
Morgenstern, Jurisdictionin Seizures Effected in Violation of InternationalLaw, 29
BRIT.Y.B. INTL L. 265 (1952).
275. Cook, 288 U.S. at 108.
276. Id. at 121-22.
277. Id. at 122.
278. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
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decree. The case was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
After reviewing the treaty, the Court reaffirmed that treaty
obligations take precedence over inconsistent state and local laws:
The rule of equality established by [the treaty] cannot be rendered
nugatory in any part of the United States by municipal ordinances

or state laws. It stands on the same footing of supremacy as do the
provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the United States. It
operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national;

and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts.

79

Because the Seattle ordinance was inconsistent with the treaty
obligation, the Court upheld Asakura's claim.
These cases are significant for two reasons.
First, they
recognize the ability of federal courts to review treaty compliance.
In both Rauscher and Cook, the Court examined federal
compliance with treaty obligations.
In Asakura, the Court
examined state compliance with treaty obligations. In each of
these cases, the Court did not hesitate to examine the treaties
and review compliance under these agreements. Second, these
cases also recognize the ability of federal courts to craft remedies
for treaty violations. The Court determined in both Rauscher and
Cook that a treaty violation divested the federal courts of
jurisdiction over the defendants. 28 0 In Asakura, the Court also
found that a treaty violation could provide a defense in state court
proceedings. 2 8 ' In short, these cases reveal that U.S. courts are
empowered to review treaty obligations and provide remedies for
any violations.
International law also recognizes that a breach of an
international agreement creates an obligation to remedy the
violation.2 8 2
According to the Restatement (Third), "[ujnder

279.
280.

Id at 341.
Indeed, the Court's language in Rauscheris particularly strildng in this

regard. The Court recognized that the federal judiciary has the power to remedy
treaty violations, thereby alleviating the potential difficulties that would arise if the
Executive Branch were required to intervene in such matters before state courts,
"a tension which has more than once become very delicate and troublesome."
Rauscher,119 U.S. at 430.

The principle we have here laid down removes this difficulty, for under the
doctrine that the treaty is the supreme law of the land, and is to be
observed by all the courts, state and national, "anything in the laws of the

states to the contrary notwithstanding," if the state court should fail to give

due effect to the rights of the party under the treaty, a remedy is found in
the judicial branch of the Federal government, which has been fully

recognized.
Id. at 430-31.
281. Asakura, 265 U.S. at 341.
282. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 528-39;
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174, 184 (April 11).
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international law, a state that has violated a legal obligation to
another state is required to terminate the violation and,
ordinarily, to make reparation, including in appropriate
circumstances restitution or compensation for loss or injury."2 83
In short, "the principle is clear: out of an international wrong
arises a right for the wronged state to request from the wrongdoing state the performance of such acts as are necessary for
reparation of the wrong done. What kind of acts these are
depends upon the merits of the case."28 4

As a first step, a country must cease its violation of
international law. 28 5 For example, in the Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran, the ICJ held that
Iran must immediately take all steps to redress the situation. 2 8 6
This included the immediate release of all U.S. nationals and the
return of U.S. property.
Once a violation has been terminated, the wronged state is
entitled to seek reparations. The primary purpose of reparations
is to reestablish the situation that would have existed if the
wrongful act or omission had not taken place. This principle was
set forth by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
seminal Chorzow Factory case:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal
act.., is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed. Restitution in kind or, if this is not possible, payment of
a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would
bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which
would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of
it-such are the principles which should serve to determine the
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international

law. 2

87

Similarly, the commentary to Restatement (Third) Section 901
provides that, "[o]rdinarily, emphasis is on forms of redress that
will undo the effect of the violation, such as restoration of the
status quo ante, restitution, or specific performance of an
undertaking."28 8
283. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 901.
284. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote 14, at 528-29.
285. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 901, n.2.
286. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. R. 3, at 44-45 (May 24).
287. Chorzow Factory Case (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at
47 (Sept. 13).
288. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 901 cmt. d. The
Restatement (Third) adds: "The obligation of a state to terminate a violation of
international law may include discontinuance, revocation, or cancellation of the act
(whether legislative, administrative, or judicial) that caused the violation." Id.
cmt. c. Similarly, Browulie notes that "[t]o achieve the object of reparation
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For several years, the International Law Commission has

been developing a set of Draft Articles on State Responsibility

which address the issue of state liability for violations of
international obligations.2 8 9 Part I of the Draft Articles concerns
290
the origins of international responsibility.

It

defines

an

internationally wrongful act as state conduct, fairly attributable to
the state, which constitutes a breach of an international
obligation.2 9 1 The conduct of any government organ, whether
executive, legislative, or judicial, shall be considered an act of the
state under international law. 29 2 In addition, the conduct of a
is also considered an
territorial governmental entity within a 2state
93
act of the state under international law.
Part II of the Draft Articles concerns the content, forms, and
degrees of international responsibility. 2 94 Article 6 of Part II
provides that a state whose conduct constitutes an internationally
wrongful act having a continuing character is under an obligation
For example, the release of an
to cease such conduct.2 9 5
detained or imprisoned
wrongfully
been
has
who
individual
wrongful act.2 9 6
internationally
an
of
cessation
the
constitutes
The issue of reparations is addressed in Article 6 bis:
1. The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act full reparation in the

tribunals may give legal restitution', in the form of a declaration that an offending
treaty, or act of the executive, legislature, or judicature, is invalid." BROWNLIE,
supranote 209, at 462
289.
See Sompong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility and InternationalLiability
Under InternationalLaw, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 821, 822-28 (1996); Robert

Rosenstock, The Forty-Eighth Session of the InternationalLaw Commission, 91 AM.
J. INT'L L. 365, 370 (1997); Robert Rosenstock, The Forty-Seventh Session of the
InternationalLaw Commission, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 106 (1996); THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: PART I, arts. 1-35 (Shabtai
Rosenne ed., 1991).
290. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its TwentyFifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/9010/Rev.1 (1973), reprinted in [1973] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 161, 165.
291. Id at 179.
292. Id. at 191, 193.
293. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its TwentySixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.1 (1974), reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N, pt. 1, at 277.
294. The International Law Commission formally adopted the articles on
cessation, reparation, restitution in kind, compensation, satisfaction and
assurances, and guarantees of nonrepetition in 1993. Robert Rosenstock, The
Forty-Ffth Session of the InternationalLaw Commission, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 134, 135
(1994).
295. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth
Session, U.N. Doc A/48/ 10, reprintedin [1993] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 2, at 54.
"The fact that detained entities are human beings, injured by their
296.
unlawful treatment in their physical and psychic integrity, in their personal liberty
and dignity (in addition to their mere economic, productive activity) makes their
release morally and legally more evidently an urgent question of cessation of the
violation." Id. at 56.
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form of restitution in kind, compensation, satisfaction and
assurances and guarantees on non-repetition, as provided in
articles 7, 8, 10 and 10 bis, either singly or in combination.
2. In the determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the
negligence or the willful act or omission of:
(a)the injured State; or
(b) a national of that State on whose behalf the claim is brought
which contributed to the damage.
3. The State which has committed the internationally wrongful act
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
97
the failure to provide full reparation.

Thus, the Draft Articles recognize four forms of reparation:
restitution in kind, compensation, satisfaction, and assurances
and guarantees of nonrepetition. 2 98
Restitution in kind is
addressed in Article 7:
The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act restitution in kind, that
is, the re-establishment of the situation that existed before the
wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that
restitution in kind:
(a)is not materially impossible;
(b) would not involve a breach of an obligation arising from a
peremptory norm of general international law;
(c) would not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit
which the injured State would gain from obtaining restitution in
kind instead of compensation; or
(d) would not seriously jeopardize the political independence or

economic stability of the State which has committed the
internationally wrongful act, whereas the injured State would not be
similarly affected if it did not obtain restitution in kind. 9 9

Article 8 addresses compensation:
1. The injured State is entitled to claim from the State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act compensation for the
damage caused by that act, if and to the extent that the damage is
not made good by restitution in kind.
2. For the purposes of the present article, compensation covers any
economically assessable damage sustained by the injured State, and
may include interest and, where appropriate, loss of profits. 0 0

In addition to restitution and compensation, reparation can
include satisfaction as well as assurances and guarantees of nonrepetition. 3 0 '
Satisfaction is appropriate for non-material
damages or injury.
It can include a formal apology, the
punishment of the individuals responsible for the violation, and
the taldng of steps to prevent a recurrence of the violation. 3 ° 2

297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 67.

301.

Jimenez de Arechaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a Centunj,

159 RECUEIL DES COURS 285, 287 (1978).
302. See BROWNLIE, supranote 209, at 458.
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Article 10 of the Draft Articles addresses the issue of satisfaction

as follows:
1. The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has
committed an internationally wrongful act satisfaction for the
damage, in particular moral damage, caused by that act, if and to
the extent necessary to provide full reparation.
2. Satisfaction may take the form of one or more of the following:
(a) an apology;
(b) nominal damages;
(c) in cases of gross infringement of the rights of the injured State,
damages reflecting the gravity of the infringement;
(d) in cases where the internationally wrongful act arose from the
serious misconduct of officials or from criminal conduct of officials
or private individuals, disciplinary action against, or punishment of,
those responsible.
3. The right of the injured State to obtain satisfaction does not
justify demands which would impair the dignity of the State which
03
has committed the internationally wrongful act0

Finally, Article 10 bis addresses assurances and guarantees
of nonrepetition:
"The injured State is entitled, where
appropriate, to obtain from the State which has committed an
internationally wrongful act assurances or guarantees of non3 4
repetition of the wrongful act." 0
While U.S. courts are not required to apply these Draft
Articles, they may look to them for guidance in developing
remedies for treaty violations.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several reasons for ensuring that the United States
complies with the obligations set forth in the Vienna Convention
as well as those set forth in other consular agreements.

3 05
Reciprocity plays an important role in international relations.
As the Supreme Court noted in Hilton v. Guyot, "... . international

law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity."3 0 6

In order to

ensure proper treatment of U.S. nationals abroad, the United

States must make comparable efforts at home. Otherwise, foreign
governments will have little incentive to comply with these
obligations.3 0 7 Indeed, the Executive Branch has long noted the

303. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, supra note 295, at 54.
304. Id
305. See generally Robert Keohane, Reciprocity in InternationalRelations, 40
INT'L ORG. 1 (Winter 1986) (arguing that institutional innovations in international
trade reflect ways to capture the benefits of reciprocity).
306. 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1894).
307. On several occasions, the United States has referred to the reciprocity
principle when other governments have failed to provide consular access to U.S.
consular officials.
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More broadly,

failure to adhere to these obligations may lead to violations of
other diplomatic and consular obligations, such as diplomatic
immunity.
Effective diplomatic and consular relations are
imperative for stable relations between nations. Political and
economic relations cannot fully develop without effective
diplomatic and consular relations.
Accordingly, proper
compliance with the Vienna Convention as well as with other
consular and diplomatic agreements is essential as a practical
matter. Finally, it is axiomatic that the United States must
comply with its treaty obligations. Quite simply, the United
States signed and duly ratified the Vienna Convention. If the
United States seeks to affirm the rule of law in both word and
deed, it must comply with and fully implement its international
obligations.
In order to improve U.S. compliance with its obligations
under the Vienna Convention and other consular agreements,
this Article sets forth the following recommendations.
First, the federal government should take steps to ensure
that all federal, state, and local agencies comply with the
provisions on consular access as set forth in the Vienna
Convention and other consular agreements.
Greater efforts must be made to ensure that federal agencies
are aware of these obligations and that they adhere to them. For
example, the State Department should increase its monitoring of
federal agencies to ensure compliance. It should send annual
notices to federal agencies describing their obligations under the
Vienna Convention. Furthermore, it should establish regular
training programs for federal agencies to ensure that law
enforcement officials are familiar with the right of consular
access. Finally, federal agencies should be required to submit an
annual report to the State Department describing their efforts to
comply with these obligations.
With respect to state and local law enforcement agencies, the
State Department currently sends a "periodic" notice regarding
consular obligations to the governor and attorney general of each
of the fifty states and to the mayors of cities with populations
exceeding 100,000 people.3 0 9 These notices should be sent
annually rather than periodically.3 1 0
The State Department
308. S. ExEc. REP. No. 91-9, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 8 (1969).
309. The last such notice was issued by the State Department in 1993. See
Daniel Sneider, U.S. Death Penalty Stirs InternationalLegal Controversy, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, May 22, 1997, at 1.
310. The State Department recently announced that it had substantially
revised its notice to law enforcement agencies. The new Consular Notification
and Access Booklet now contains extensive instructions and guidance relating
to the arrest and detention of foreign nationals. See U.S. Dep't of State,
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should also establish regular training programs for state and local
law enforcement agencies to ensure that law enforcement officials
311
are familiar with consular notification.

If these efforts fail, Congress should enact legislation that
requires state and local law enforcement agencies to comply with
the obligations set forth in the Vienna Convention.3 12 While
codification is not necessary to implement these obligations in the

United States, it may be the most effective way of ensuring that
all agencies are fully informed of such obligations and that they

comply with them.
Second, the federal government should cooperate with foreign
governments to establish procedures that improve compliance
with the Vienna Convention and other consular agreements.3 13
For example, the United States and foreign governments can
develop procedures to facilitate communication between consular
officials and law enforcement officials. Special liaison officers can
be established whose primary responsibility is to communicate
with consular officials.
Procedures can be established for
communication in particularly serious cases such as capital
cases. Through regular contact with consular officials, these
liaison officers can promote a constructive dialogue and reduce
the likelihood of disputes.

Instructions for Federal, State and Other Local Law Enforcement and Other
Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the Rights of
Consular Officials to Assist Them (1998).
311. Recently, the State Department began holding briefings with state
and local law enforcement agencies concerning consular access. The State
Department is also significantly revising its notice to law enforcement
agencies regarding consular access. See Sam Howe Verhovek, U.S. Renews
Campaign to Safeguard Rights of Foreign Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997,
at A27.
312. Such legislation would appear to be constitutional under the Supreme
Court's analysis in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). But see Printz v.
United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997) (holding that the federal government may not
order state or local officials to carry out federal regulatory schemes).
313. For example, the INS now requires consular notification when detained
Mexican nationals seek interior repatriation. In September 1995, the United
States and Mexico, through the Binational Commission Subgroup on Migration
and Consular Affairs agreed to establish the voluntary interior repatriation
program for Mexican nationals. Fact Sheet: Cooperation With Mexico-in the
National Interest, U.S. DEP'I OF STATE DISPATCH, 257, Vol. 7 No. 21 ISSN: 10519693, May 20, 1996. Under the interior repatriation program, Mexican nationals
caught multiple times trying to enter the United States illegally are offered the
opportunity to be returned to the interior of Mexico, closer to their homes (and
away from the border). To qualify for this program, detained nationals must be
interviewed by Mexican consular officials prior to repatriation.
Consular
notification is also required when minor children are detained by INS officials.

These INS programs, however, only apply to a small percentage of detained
Mexican nationals. Telephone Interview with Mexican Consulate, San Diego,
California (Apr. 15, 1997).
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Third, law enforcement agencies can take several steps to
facilitate compliance with consular notification obligations. One
of the most significant impediments to proper compliance is the
inability of state and local law enforcement agencies to identify
foreign nationals in a timely fashion. This is not surprising given
the large number of detainees currently being processed in the
criminal justice system. One option is to require all detainees to
identify their citizenship at the initial booking stage. 3 14 Once
this information is acquired, it can then be distributed on a
regular basis to special liaison officers responsible for
31 5
communicating with consular officials.
Procedures can be established to facilitate communication
between consular officials and detained nationals. Consular
information can be posted in detention facilities, listing the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of foreign consulates.

Posted notices can also describe the provisions on consular
access. When consular officials communicate with detained
nationals, they should be provided access at detention facilities
that is comparable to the access provided to attorneys.
Fourth, Congress should enact legislation that explicitly
recognizes the right of foreign governments to seek redress for
treaty violations in federal courts. At present, the Eleventh
Amendment raises a potential obstacle to such actions filed in
federal court against state governments and officials.
The
Supreme Court, however, has recognized the ability of Congress
to abrogate state immunity from suit. To succeed, legislation
must evince an unmistakably clear statement of congressional
intent to abrogate state immunity under the Eleventh
316
Amendment.

314. This system has been used in San Diego County, California for several
years. Following the booking stage, two lists are distributed on a weekly basis.

One list identifies all foreign nationals in custody. The other list identifies foreign
nationals who reside in countries which require mandatory notification of
detention. Telephone Interview with Sheriff's Department, County of San Diego
(Apr. 28, 1997).
315. With respect to detained Mexican nationals, it appears that compliance
with the consular notification procedures is higher in cities near the Mexican

border and in cities where a Mexican consulate is located. Id.

316. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1132-33 (1996).
See also Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L.

REV. 102 (1996).
Alternatively, Congress has the authority to provide for private suits against
states. Such actions would be similar to qui tam actions. A qui tam action is a civil
action brought by an individual on behalf of the individual and the government.

Any potential recovery would be divided between the individual and the

government. See Jonathan Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress' Power to
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. RaV. 539, 551 (1995); Susan Bandes,
Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 350-54
(1995); Evan Caminker, The Constitutionalityof Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341,
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Fifth, if necessary, the federal government should sue on
behalf of foreign governments to challenge treaty violations
The federal
committed by state or local governments. 3 17
government has already done so on several occasions. In United
States v. City of Glen Cove, the United States sought to enjoin
Glen Cove from assessing property taxes on property owned by
the Soviet Union. 3 18 The United States argued that the Soviet
property was exempt from municipal taxes pursuant to the 1968
Consular Convention between the United States and the Soviet
Union.3 19 The district court acknowledged that the United States
3 20
may sue to prevent state action that violates treaty obligations.
Such action was held to be consistent with the constitutional
responsibility of the federal government in the realm of foreign
affairs. "The conduct of foreign relations would be hampered and
embarrassed if the United States Government were powerless to
require units of local government to comply with treaty
obligations, and if a treaty could be enforced only by the foreign
government making itself a party to litigation before state or
federal courts."3 21 Thus, the district court granted an injunction
against Glen Cove, enjoining it from assessing municipal taxes
against the Soviet property. The Supreme Court has likewise
recognized the right of the federal government to bring lawsuits
that enjoin state violations of federal law, including treaty
obligations. 32 2 Indeed, State Department officials have already
suggested that such action may be warranted in some cases
3 23
involving the Vienna Convention.

343 (1989). Here, Congress would need to adopt legislation authorizing actions in
the name of the United States to enforce treaty obligations.
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 415 (1972);
317.
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 74 (1914). For an analysis of

the ability of the United States to file an action in order to vindicate a foreign
relations interest, see Memorandum for the Attorney General, Jan. 18, 1979, supra
note 241.
322 F. Supp. 149, 150 (E.D.N.Y.), affid, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971).
318.
See also United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1982)
(acknowledging the right of the United States to sue to enforce its policies and laws
even when it has no pecuniary interest in the outcome).
See Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. at 150.
319.
Id. at 152.
320.
Id.
321.
See Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925) ("The
322.
United States is asserting its sovereign power to regulate commerce and to control
the navigable waters within its jurisdiction. It has standing in this suit not only to
remove obstruction to interstate and foreign commerce, the main ground, which we
will deal with last, but also to carry out treaty obligations to a foreign power ....
The Attorney General by virtue of his office may bring this proceeding and no
statute is necessary to authorize the suit."). See also United States v. Minnesota,
270 U.S. 181, 195-96 (1926); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683 (1886).
323. Frank Green, Treaty Enforcement Urged: Aliens Allege Right to
Contact Consul Ignored, RICHMOND TIMES, May 27, 1997, at B1.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

In many respects, Paraguay v. Allen and United Mexican
States v. Woods signal a unique moment in American
jurisprudence. As indicated, these cases may be the first in
which foreign governments have sought to enforce treaty
obligations in federal courts.
More significantly, these cases may represent the face of
Since 1945, the number of
future litigation in U.S. courts.
3 24
bilateral and multilateral treaties has increased significantly.
These agreements regulate a variety of subject matter, ranging
from environmental obligations to human rights. By their nature,
many of these agreements address issues that have traditionally
fallen under the exclusive jurisdiction of national governments. If
the U.S. government fails to ensure both federal and state
compliance with international obligations, foreign governments
may become increasingly frustrated at the limited application of
these obligations in the United States. These lawsuits are but one
325
manifestation of this frustration.
Given the limitations of international tribunals, it is not
surprising that foreign governments should seek to affirm treaty
While some international
obligations in domestic courts.
tribunals are quite effective, the majority have limited powers and
lack enforcement mechanisms.3 2 6 In contrast, domestic courts

324. Between 1946 and 1950, 5598 treaties entered into force. In contrast,
15,574 treaties entered into force between 1971 and 1975. WORLD TREATY INDEX,
Ref. Vol., 124 (Peter Robn ed. 1984).
325.
Responses to U.S. noncompliance with the Vienna Convention can be
found at both the domestic and international levels.
In May 1997, a group of American attorneys, representing foreign nationals
who have been convicted or sentenced to death, submitted a joint letter to
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, urging the State Department to comply with
the Vienna Convention. Letter to the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary
of State, Dept of State (May 14, 1997).
At the international level, two complaints have been filed against the
United States with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for
violations of the Vienna Convention. See Individual Complaint to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights Against the United States of America
on Behalf of Carlos Santana, Case No. 11.130, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Mar. 11,
1993). Individual Complaint to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights Against the United States of America on Behalf of Cesar Fierro, Case
No. 11.331, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (July 21, 1994). The complaints charge that the
United States failed to provide these foreign nationals consular access
pursuant to the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., Santana v. State, 714 S.W.2d 1
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Fierro v. State, 706 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986). Both complaints are currently pending before the Commission. For
discussion of these cases, see Shank & Quigley, supra note 11, at 721-26.
326. The most notable exceptions are the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation
of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991) (outlining the role of the Europema Courts in
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often provide a more effective claims process. This may explain
the profound increase in the amount of international litigation
that is currently taking place in U.S. courts.
In recent years, the United States has become a leader in
affirming the law of nations in its courts. As a result, countries
look to the United States for guidance in the development of their
own legal systems.3 2 7 For these reasons, the lessons of Paraguay
v. Allen and United Mexican States v. Woods are twofold. They
demonstrate the need to ensure that treaty obligations are strictly
applied throughout our federal system, and that federal courts
remain available to enforce these obligations.

the transformation of Europe); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a
Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981) (examining the role of the
European Court of Justice in the development of the European legal system).
Toward
327. See Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law:
Internationalizationof Central-EasternEuropean Constitutions?, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
427 (1996).
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POSTSCRIPr
On the evening of April 14, 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court
1
denied appeals filed in both the Paraguay and Breard cases.
Within a few hours of the Court's ruling, Angel Breard was
executed by lethal injection. His execution culminated one of the
most intriguing and yet troubling legal journeys in recent
memory.
Prior to Breard's execution, Paraguay instituted proceedings
against the United States before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) on April 3, 1998.2 In its Application, Paraguay argued that
the arrest and detention of Breard violated and continued to
violate Paraguay's rights under the Vienna Convention. Because
of Breard's pending execution, Paraguay requested the ICJ to
issue provisional measures that would preserve the status quo

pending a final ruling by the Court. Oral arguments were held
before the ICJ on April 7.
On April 9, 1998, the ICJ issued an order on Paraguay's
request for provisional measures. In a unanimous ruling, the ICJ
determined that Breard's execution would cause irreparable harm
to Paraguay's case and preclude any meaningful outcome from
the Court's ruling on the merits. Accordingly, the ICJ held that
"[t]he United States should take all measures at its disposal to
ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the
final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court
of all measures which it has taken in implementation of this
Order."3 The ICJ also set an expedited briefing schedule for the
parties.
Following the ICJ's ruling, the United States government
pursued two quite inconsistent paths. In a brief filed with the
Supreme Court, the United States urged the Court to deny the

1.
In addition to the pending certiorari petitions filed by Paraguay and
Breard, the Supreme Court also dismissed two additional applications, a petition

for an original writ of habeas corpus filed by Breard and a motion for leave to file a
bill of complaint filed by Paraguay.
2.
Case Concerning the Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America) (Application Instituting
Proceedings Submitted by the Government of the Republic of Paraguay) (Apr. 3,
1998). Paraguay instituted the proceedings pursuant to the Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes which accompanies the Vienna
Convention. 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
3.
Case Concerning the Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America) (Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures) (Order) (Apr. 9, 1998).
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claims of both Paraguay and Breard. 4 Writing on behalf of the
U.S. government, the Solicitor General argued that neither the
Vienna Convention nor the Treaty of Friendship between the
United States and Paraguay provided a cause of action for
Paraguay or its official representatives to pursue a judicial remedy
that would vacate a state criminal conviction.
"It is most
implausible that the contracting parties to the Convention
intended such a remedy, and it is therefore not surprising that
the decision below is not contrary to any decision of this Court,
any federal court of appeals, any state supreme court, or (as far
as we are aware) the court of any foreign nation."5 Furthermore,
the Solicitor General indicated that rules of procedural default
barred Breard's claims under the Vienna Convention. Finally, the
Solicitor General argued that the ICJ's order should not be
considered binding by the Supreme Court.
At the same time, however, the State Department urged the
Governor of Virginia to stay the execution pending final resolution
of the case by the ICJ. In a letter to Governor James Gilmore of
Virginia, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright indicated that in
light of the ICJ's ruling and the unique and difficult issues raised
6
by the case, the Governor should stay Breard's execution.
According to the Secretary of State, "[t]he execution of Mr. Breard
in the present circumstances could lead some countries to
contend incorrectly that the U.S. does not take seriously its
obligations under the Convention." 7 Because of the reciprocal
nature of the Vienna Convention, Secretary Albright expressed
concern for "our ability to ensure that Americans are protected
when living or traveling abroad."8
On April 14, 1998, the Supreme Court denied the petitions
for certiorari and the accompanying applications for stays of
execution filed in both the Paraguayand Breard cases. 9 In a per

curiam ruling, the Court indicated that Breard's claim under the
Vienna Convention was procedurally defaulted. The Court found
that the treaty did not explicitly prohibit the use of such
procedural rules. "[Absent a clear and express statement to the
contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State." 10 The Court also

4.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Paraguay v. Gilmore, (No.

97-1390).
5.
Id. at 28.
6.
Letter from the Honorable Madeline Albright, Secretary of State, Dep't of
State, to James Gilmore, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998).

7.
8.

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.

9.

Paraguay v. Gilmore, No. 97-1390, slip op. (Supreme Court Apr. 14,

1998) (per curiam).
10.
Id. at 5.
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found that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, which was enacted after the Vienna Convention, precluded
habeas relief if a petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis
of his claim in state court. Applying the last-in-time doctrine, the
Court ruled that Breard was now procedurally barred from raising
the Vienna Convention claim since he had failed to assert the
claim in state court. With respect to Paraguay's claim, the Court
found that "neither the text nor the history of the Vienna
Convention clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of
action in United States' courts to set aside a criminal conviction
1
and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions."
It also found that the Eleventh Amendment provided a separate
basis for denying Paraguay's lawsuit. The Court found no
continuing consequences arising from Virginia's failure to notify
Paraguayan officials. Furthermore, the Court determined that
neither Paraguay nor its Consul General could pursue any claims
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.12 Paraguay was not a "person" for
purposes of Section 1983 nor was it "within the jurisdiction" of
the United States. These restrictions also applied to the Consul
General.
Finally, the Court expressed regret that it had to
consider these actions while proceedings were also pending before
the ICJ.
"Nonetheless, this Court must decide questions
presented to it on the basis of law....

If the Governor wishes to

wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But
nothing
in our existing case law allows us to make that choice for
13
hilrn.'

In dissent, Justice Stevens expressed concern with Virginia's
decision to schedule the execution at such an early date. Under
the Court's rules, a petition for writ of certiorari could have been
filed as late as May 19, 1998.14 By scheduling the execution for
April 14, Virginia significantly reduced the time for argument and
consideration established by the Court's standard review
procedures. "There is no compelling reason for refusing to follow
the procedures that we have adopted for the orderly disposition of
noncapital cases. Indeed, the international aspects of this case
provide an additional reason for adhering to our established Rules
and procedures."' 5 Justice Breyer echoed these concerns, arguing

11.
Id.at 6.
12.
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 provides a cause of action to any "person within
the jurisdiction" of the United States for the deprivation of "any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'
13.
Paraguay,slip op. at 7-8.
14.
Supreme Court Rule 13.1 provides that 'a petition for a writ of certiorari
to review a judgment in any case, civil or criminal, entered by... a United States
court of appeals ... is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90
days after entry of the judgment."
15.
Paraguay,slip op. at 9.
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that several issues, including the question of procedural default
and the relevance of the ICJ's proceedings, merited more careful
deliberations. Finally, Justice Ginsburg would also have granted
the stay of execution in order for the Court to consider Breard's
petition in accordance with its regular schedule and procedures.
Following the Supreme Court's ruling, the Governor of
Virginia issued a statement indicating his refusal to grant
Breard's request for clemency. After several last-minute petitions
were denied by the Fourth Circuit, Breard was executed by lethal
injection at the state prison in Jarratt, Virginia.
The consequences of the Paraguayand Breard cases extend
far beyond Virginia's execution chamber and will have a profound
impact on both the national and international levels.
At the national level, the Supreme Court's ruling further
clarifies its position on treaty interpretation and the relationship
between international law and domestic courts. The decision
reiterates the Court's position that a treaty, through its text or
history, must provide a clear and express statement in order for a
particular right or obligation to be recognized by the federal
courts. As a result, the Court refused to recognize Breard's claim
that the rules of procedural default did not apply to treaty
obligations. Similarly, the Court refused to recognize a private
right of action for Paraguay arising from the Vienna Convention.
The decision also emphasizes that treaty obligations must be
viewed in the same light as any other federal right. As a result,
the rules of procedural default applied with equal rigor to
violations of the Vienna Convention. Finally, the Court's decision
is significant because it suggests that the rulings of the ICJ are
not binding in the United States.
The outcome of the Supreme Court's ruling will make it
increasingly difficult for foreign governments to seek redress for
treaty violations in federal courts. The Court suggests that a
private right of action will only be recognized if the treaty text or
its history provide clear support for such a determination.
Otherwise, the Court will simply not infer that a treaty obligation
carries a concomitant right to seek redress for violations thereof.
In so ruling, the Court has emphasized the distinction between
whether a treaty is self-executing and whether a treaty creates a
private right of action to seek judicial remedies. 16
Ironically, these cases have increased public awareness of
consular notification and access in the United States. The State
Department has begun to conduct briefings on consular
notification and access for law enforcement officials throughout
the country. It has developed a more comprehensive guide on

16.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111, cmt. h.
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them issues for law enforcement agencies. 17 It has also produced
a pocket-sized reference card for law enforcement officers to carry
that describe the requirements of consular notification and
access.

At the international level, however, the failure of the United
States to prevent Breard's execution will undoubtedly have a
negative impact on the relationship between the United States
and other countries. 1 8 Some countries may simply refuse to
provide U.S. nationals with consular notification and access when
they are detained. Other countries will question the broader
commitment of the United States to the rule of law. It has
undoubtedly undermined the legitimacy of the ICJ and may
embolden other countries to disregard the rulings of international
tribunals.

As indicated earlier, cases involving international agreements
and domestic obligations will become increasingly common in the
coming years. It is imperative for the United States to develop
more appropriate responses to treaty violations.
Failure to
develop effective procedures that protect the rights of both foreign
sovereigns and their nationals will further erode the legitimacy of
the U.S. commitment to the rule of law and may undermine the
effectiveness of treaties worldwide.

17.
U.S. Dep't of State, Instructions for Federal, State, and Other Local Law
Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States
and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them (1998).

18.
The governments of Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico submitted
an amicus brief in support of Paraguay's petition for certiorari. Brief of Amici
Curiae Republic of Argentina, Republic of Brazil, Republic of Ecuador, and
Republic of Mexico in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Paraguay v.
Gilmore, (No. 97-1390).

